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FAILURE OF ACCUSED TO TESTIFY
At common law the accused in a criminal case was not com-
petent to testify. This disqualification has been removed by
statute in England and in every state in the United States ex-
cept Georgia, where the accused is privileged only to make a
[955]
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"statement." 1 In the majority of the states the statute provides
that the accused shall at his own request, but not otherwise, be
competent to testify, but that a neglect or refusal so to testify
shall create no presumption against him. Most of the statutes
also expressly forbid any comment on such failure to take the
stand.2
The original qualifying statutes in Maine 3 and California 4
did not forbid the drawing of an adverse inference from the
defendant's silence. Those of New Jersey,5 South Carolina," and
Georgia 7 have never forbidden such an inference. The Ohio
statute 8 originally provided that no presumption should arise
because of the accused's refusal to testify, but this has been
changed by an amendment of the state constitution.,
Five of the statutes prohibit either "reference to or comment
upon" 10 silence; two others provide that it shall not be alluded
to.11 The statutes in Indiana, Nevada, and Washington 12 impose
an affirmative duty on the trial court to charge that the jury
1 See infra note 7. Maine abolished the disqualification first, in 1864;
England last, in 1898.
2 The Massachusetts statute provides that ". . . The defendant in the
trial of a . . . criminal proceeding shall, at his own request, but not
otherwise, be allowed to testify; but his neglect or refusal to testify shall
not create any presumption against him." Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c.
233, § 20. Similar statutes are: Md. Ann. Code (1924) Art. 35, § 4; N.
Y. Code Cr. Proc. (1881) § 393; Tenn. Ann. Code (Shannon, 1919) § 5600.
The Pennsylvania statute provides that ". . . the neglect or refusal of
any defendant, actually on trial in a criminal court, to offer himself as a
witness [shall not] be treated as creating any presumption against him,
or be adversely referred to by the Court or counsel during the trial." Pa.
Digest (1920) § 21864. Other statutes of this type are Ala. Cr. Code
(1923) § 5632; Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) § 9815; Va. Gen. Laws (1923)
§ 4778.
8 Me. Acts 1864, c. 280.
4 Cal. Stat. 1865-1866, c. 644, p. 865.
5 N. J. Comp. Stat. (1910) (Cr. Proc.) § 57.
6 S. C. Code Cr. Proc. (1922) par. 97.
7 Ga. Pdnal Code (1926) §§ 1036, 1037.
8 Ohio Gen. Code (1926) § 13661.
9 The Ohio Constitution, Art. I, § 10, was amended in 1912 to read: "No
person shall lie compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against
himself; but his failure to testify may be considered by the court and jury
and may be made the subject of comment by counsel."
For expressions of satisfaction with the present rule in Ohio, see Dun-
more, Fdilure of the Accused to Testify (1917) 26 YALE: LAW JOURNAL
464; Price, Comment (1922) 13 Joun. CRanm. LAW 292. But of. ibid.
295, et seq.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1927) c. 38, § 758; Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) § 12552;
Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) § 10139; W. Va. Code Ann. (1923) c. 152, § 19;
Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) § 7507.
11 Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) § 9815; Texas Code Cr. Proc. (1925) Art. 710.
12 Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) § 2267; Nev. Rev. Laws (1912) § 7161;
Wash.'Comp. Stat. (Rem. 1922) § 2148. ,
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must not take the accused's failure to testify as evidence against
him. In Iowa it is made a misdemeanor for the prosecutor to
comment on such failure, and there, as well as in Oldahoma, 13
improper comment is expressly made ground for a new trial. In
the statutes of North Dakota, Missouri, and Kansas there is a
clause to the effect that neither court nor jury shall consider the
defendant's silence.
Express comment on a defendant's failure to testify, made by
the prosecuting attorney in argument to the jury, is held im-
proper under the statutes which simply provide that such failure
shall create no presumption against the accused as well as under
those specifically forbidding comment.' 4 As to the effect of such
a reference occurring in a disclaimer of intention to draw an
adverse inference, *or in an explanation or withdrawal of other
remarks, there is an apparent conflict..15 Some courts will hold
a statement referring to the defendant's privilege to be within
the statute where it is overheard by the jury, even though not
addressed to them, 16 but it is doubtful whether many courts will
go this far. 7 Any adverse comment on the personal appearance
'13 Iowa Code (1927) c. 646, § 13890; Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921) § 2698.
3.4 Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60, 13 Sup. Ct. 765 (1893) ; Bridg-
man v. State, 170 Ark. 709, 280 S. W. 982 (1920); Coleman v. State, 111
Ind. 563, 13 N. E. 100 (1887) (remark in opening argument that defendant
has not been sworn but that jury should watch him if he does go upon the
stand is improper); State v. Tennison, 42 Kan. 330, 22 Pac. 429 (189);
State v. Drummins, 274 Mo. 632, 204 S. W. 271 (1918); People v. Ltinko-
witz, 220 N. Y. 399, 115 N. E. 987 (1917) ; Staples v. State, 89 Tenn. 231,
14 S. W. 603 (1890).
'S Improper reference was cured by disclaimer and an instruction by the
court in Commonwealth v. Richmond, 207 Mass. 240, 93 N. E. 810 (1911);
People v. Hess, 85 Mich. 128, 48 N. W. 181 (1891). Conzta: Jaclxon v.
State, 45 Fla. 38, 34 So. 243 (1903) (new trial ordered where the only
reference to the accused's silence occurred in the course of disclaiming that
a proper remark -was intended as a reference). The remark by the prose-
cutor: "Although I have no right to swear any man accused of crime, I
have a right . . . etc." was held no infraction of the statute. Sawyers
v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 356, 13 S. E. 703 (1891). Contra: People v.
Lay, 193 Mich. 17, 159 N. W. 299 (1916) (remark: "I have not a word
about this respondent . . . testifying here, but . . . " held violative
of statute).
316A new trial was granted in the following cases: State v. Holmes, 05
Minn. 230, 68 N. W. 11 (1896) (reference made in discussion between
counsel); State v. Bennett, 21 S. D. 396, 113 N. W. 78 (1907) (reference
made in argument to court about advisability of holding night session);
State v. Ryan, 70 Iowa 154, 30 N. W. 397 (1880) (reference made in argu-
ment to court). Of these jurisdictions, the statute of Minnesota alone for-
bids "allusion to" as well as comment upon defendant's silence.
7No impropriety was found in the following cases: State v. Lanyon, 83
Conn. 449, 76 Atl. 1095 (1910); State v. Mosley, 31 Ran. 353 (1884)
(reference occurring in argument as to whether evidence, properly rebuttal
evidence, should be admitted in chief); Commonwealth v. Cannon, 13 Phila.
456 (Pa. 1879) (prosecutor asked court whether accused had been informed
957
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of a defendant who does not testify is regarded as equivalent to
express comment upon his silence.18 It seems that even where
counsel for the defense refers in argument to the silence of his
client the prosecuting attorney is not thereby privileged to com-
ment upon it. 19 But the prosecuting attorney may refer to the
evidence introduced by the state as uncontradicted or unex-
plained even where the defendant does not testify, and such a
reference will not violate the statutes under consideration unless
it "calls the attention of the jury so pertinently to this fact
(silence of the accused) that the ordinary mind would understand
that this was the meaning and direction of the comment." 20
Thus a general reference to the evidence of the state as uncon-
troverted is proper.21 Moreover, the state may point out the fail-
ure of the accused to establish an alibi,22 to explain specific com-
promising facts, 23 or to contradict testimony as to a conversa-
of his "right to testify"); McDonald v. State, 212 N. W. 635 (Wis. 1927)
(request to cross-examine defendant, made to court, held not comment with-
in statute).8 Bestor v. State, 209 Ala. 693, 96 So. 899 (1923); State v. Tucker, 190
N. C. 708, 130 S. E. 720 (1925). But cf. Bachelor v. State, 113 So. 67
(Ala. 1927).
19 Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239 (1877); Austin v. People, 102
Ill. 261 (1882). Contra: State v. Williams, 28 Nev. 395, 82 Pac. 853
(1905)- (court's action in allowing such answering argument upheld where
there was also charge to draw no inference against the defendant on ac-
count of his silence).
20 Wheeler, C. J., in State v. Monahan, 96 Conn. 289, 291, 114 Atl. 102
(1921), In People v. Cassidy, 260 Pac. 313 (Cal. App. 1927), the following
remarks were characterized as improper (but cured by instruction) : "In
whose power, I ask you, within whose mind and power lies the control of
the situation to tell you whether it (state's evidence) is true or not true?
But they stand bn their constitutional rights of the presentation of evidence
and the doctrine of reasonable doubt, and no evidence whatever has been
presented . .. .21 Davis v. State, 298 S. W. 359 (Ark. 1927) ; People v. Calvert, 251 Pac.
244 (Cal. App. 1926); People v. McNamara, 65 Cal. App. 521, 224 Pac. 476
(1924) ("not a single piece of testimony has been brought forward . . .
against the testimony . . . of the people"); State v. Kittenbrink, 197
Iowa 968, 192 N. W. 157 (1924) ("pertinent facts developed by the state
tending to prove guilt have not been denied"); State v. Labore, 80 Kan.
664, 103 Pac. 106 (1909) (no dvidence to contradict sale of liquor).
22 State v. Murray, 292 S. W. 434 (Mo. 1926) ("Where is the alibi for
defendant except for his wife?"); Enix v. State, 299 S. W. 430 (Tex. Cr.
App. 1927) ("Where is that testimony that would warrant you to believe
that defendant, at time of crime was anywhere than there?"); Sutton v.
Commonwealth, 85 Va. 128, 7 S. E. 323 (1888) ("defendant has not ac-
counted for his whereabouts").
23 Markham v. State, 149 Ark. 507, 233 S. W. 676 (1921) (remark: "We
find five of them going towards the still and only one of them . . .
denies having gone there," held proper); People v. Gleason, 238 111. App.
168 (1925) (remark: ". . . there is no evidence . . . contradicting
state's testimony that defendant rented this property and that there were
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tion.24 It is generally allowable to comment on the defendant's
failure to produce a witness whose testimony, according to the
story of the defense, would exculpate the accused or deny or ex-
plain inculpatory facts.25 But where such witness is a co-defend-
ant not on trial, there is a conflict as to whether failure to call
him affords an inference.2 1 There is sharp conflict and a fairly
even split in the authorities on the question as to whether such a
reference is permissable when the testimony of the accused would
be the only evidence available to contradict that of the state.Y7
The privilege of the court to comment is almost equally re-
stricted. The English statute provides that the "failure of any
various forms of gambling there . . 2' held proper); People v. Marcus,
220 App. Div. 697, 222 N. Y. Supp. 456 (2d Dept. 1927) (defendant's pos-
session of stolen furs may be commented upon as unexplained); White v.
State, 298 S. W. 896 (Tex. Cr. App. 1927) (reference to compromising atti-
tude of accused when arrested for violation of liquor law held proper).
.4Drane v. State, 92 Miss. 180, 45 So. 149 (1907); Territory v. McGrath,
5 Utah 525, 17 Pac. 116 (1888).
- Wireman v. Commonwealth, 211 Ky. 495, 277 S. W. 822 (1925) ; Com-
monwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 151 N. E. 839 (1926); State v. Boyd,
199 Iowa 1206, 200 N. W. 205 (1924) ; Prater v. State, 104 Tex. Cr. App.
669, 284 S. W. 965 (1926); Werner v. State, 189 Wis. 26, 20G N. W. 898
(1926). Alabama requires that such witness be not "accessible" to both
parties. Jones v. State, 109 So. 564 (Ala. 1926). In Illinois it is improper
to comment on the defendant's failure to call a witness. People v. Lanzgem,
307 Ill. 56, 138 N. E. 222 (1923). But otherwise where the defendant
attempts to account for his failure so to do. People v. Swift, 319 Ill. 359,
150 N. E. 263 (1925).
26 Comment was allowed in the following cases: McElwain v. Common-
wealth, 146 Ky. 104, 142 S. W. 234 (1912); State v. Dunn, 161 La. 532, 109
So. 56 (1926); Cole v. State, 16 Okla. Cr. App. 420, 183 Pac. 734 (1919)
(co-defendant had been convicted). Contra: Brock v. State, 123 Ala. 24,
26 So. 329 (1898); People v. Schultz, 210 Mich. 297, 178 N. W. 89 (1920).
2 In the following cases the prosecution was allowed to refer to the wit-
ness's testimony as uncontradicted: Clinton v. State, 56 Fla. 57, 47 So.
389 (1908) ; People v. Paisley, 299 Ill. 576, 132 N. E. 822 (1921) (testimony
as to alleged offer of bribe); State v. Solomon, 210 N. W. 448 (Iowa, 192) ;
State v. Clarke, 48 Nev. 134, 228 Pac. 582 (1924); State v. Kincaid, 140 S.
E. 338 (W. Va. 1927) (statutory rape). Contra: Barnes v. United States,
8 F. (2d) 832 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925), noted in (1926) 24 MiCH. L. RLv. 615;
People v. Payne, 131 Mich. 474, 91 N. W. 739 (1902) (seduction); State
v. Snyder, 182 Mo. 462, 82 S. W. 12 (1904) ; Commonwealth v. Foley, 24 Pa.
Super. 414 (1904); Boles v. State, 288 S. W. 198 (Tex. Cr. App. 1926).
In Massachusetts, a charge that the jury consider the defendant's "fail-
ure . . . to produce evidence in his power to produce, to meet evidence
of commonwealth" was held prejudicial unless limited to evidence other
than the defendant's testimony. Commonwealth v. Harlow, 110 Mass. 411
(1872). But cf. Commonwealth v. Richmond, su.pra note 15 (where the
argument of the prosecuting attorney that every person, so far as lmown,
except the defendant, who had an opportunity to do the ldling had testified
and, if believed, was innocent, leaving only the defendant unaccounted for,




person charged with an offense . . . to give evidence shall
not be made the subject of any comment by the prosecution." 28
This has been construed as allowing the judge to urge an infer-
ence of guilt from the failure of the accused to testify.2 But
the American statutes cited above 30 which forbid such an infer-
ence preclude the court as well as the prosecuting attorney from
suggesting it. 31 An instruction that the jury shall not consider
the defendant's silence as evidence against him is quite generally
held proper,8 2 even where unrequested. There is a dictum in a
Minnesota case, however, to the effect that such a charge would
violate the statute in that state even though requested by the
defense.33 Where there is no specific statutory provision to the
contrary, it does not, as a rule, constitute error for the court to
omit any instruction on this point unless there has been an im-
proper reference by the prosecuting attorney or unless the court
has been asked so to instruct. 4 In this event, according to the
general rule, the court must cover the point in its charge to the
jury.35 According to some of the cases this is sufficiently accom-
plished by the general statement that the presumption of the de-
fendant's innocence remains with him throughout the trial unless
and until overcome by positive evidence. 0  This is insufficient
28 (1898) 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, § 1.
29 Regina v. Rhodes [1899] 1 Q. B. 77. And cf. Ex parte Kops [1894]
A. C. 650. The Privy Council here gave a similar construction to a statute
rendering the accused "competent but not compellable" to testify. (1892)
55 Vict. No. 5.
30 This reference is only to those cited supra note 2.
31 State v. Banks, 78 Me. 490, 7 Atl. 269 (1886).
32 State v. Goff, 62 Kan. 104, 61 Pac. 683 (1900) (request); State v.
Landry, 85 Me. 95, 26 Atl. 998 (1892) (request); State v. DeWitt, 186 Mo.
61, 84 S. W. 956 (1905). (no request); State v. Carlisle, 28 S. D. 169, 132
N. NV. 686 (1911).
83 State v. Pearce, 56 Minn. 226, 235, 57 N. W. 652, 655 (1894). The
case holds that it is no error to refuse such a request, but it is said that
the charge would be an "allusion to" the defendant's silence within the
statutory prohibition. Similar phraseology in the statutes of Michigan,
Nebraska, and West Virginia does not seem to have received this construc-
tion. Ferguson v. State, 52 Neb. 432, 72 N. W. 590 (1897). And see cases
infra note 35. Query as to the construction of the similar Wyoming provi-
sion. See infra note 36.
34 State v. Williams, 90 Conn. 126, 96 At]. 370 (1916) ; State v. Younger,
70 Kan. 226, 78 Pac. 429 (1904); Metz v. State, 46 Neb. 547, 65 N. W. 190
(1895); State v. Magers, 36 Or. 38, 58 Pac. 892 (1899). Indiana, Nevada
and Washington impose an affirmative statutory duty to charge. See
statutes, supra note 12.
85 State v. Goff, supra note 32; State v. Landry, supra note 32; People
v. Prevost, 144 Mich. 17, 107 N. W. 716 (1906); State v. Wimpsett, 189
N. W. 983 (S. D. 1922); State v. Walker, 94 W. Va. 691, 120 S. B. 171
(1923), noted in (1924) 22 MIcH. L. Ruv. 841. Contra: State v. Taylor,
261 Mo. 210, 168 S. W. 1191 (1914).
30 Roberts v. State, 72 Fla. 132, 72 So. 649 (1916); Leslie v. State, 10
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in most jurisdictions, where a charge more or less in the terms
of the statute is required.37
Where the defendant has taken the stand, it is generally held
that the prosecuting attorney may comment on any failure by
the accused to testify to or explain any facts or circumstances
tending to criminate him; and an inference of guilt may be urged
from such an omission.3  The Missouri court formerly dis-
sented from this proposition,"9 but the older decisions have been
overruled and such comment is now allowed there.,9 Moreover,
where the defendant takes the stand and testifies, the weight of
authority allows him to be questioned in cross-examination, to
impeach his credibility, as to whether he had not availed himself
of his privilege on a former hearing of the case.41 There seems
to be more hesitation, however, in allowing the prosecuting attor-
ney to comment on such former silence. -
The statutes of Iowa and Oldahoma make a new trial impera-
tive where a reference to the defendant's silence has occurred."3
A substantial number of other courts have ruled that improper
comment requires a new trial even where, on objection by the
defendant, the court has stopped such argument and instructed
the jury to disregard it,4 and the right to a new trial has not
Wyo. 10, 65 Pac. 849 (1901) (no intimation that such a charge would be
erroneous).
3 See cases supra note 35.
3 8 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 Sup. Ct. 192 (1917);
State v. Feinberg, 105 Conn. 115, 134 At. 228 (1926); Brashears v. State,
58 Md. 563 (1882); People v. Trybus, 219 N. Y. 18, 113 N. E. 538 (191G).
39 State v. Graves, 95 Mo. 510, 8 S. W. 739 (1888).
40 State v. Larkin, 250 Mo. 218, 157 S. W. 600 (1913); State v. Drew,
213 S. W. 106 (Mo. 1919).
4'Raffel v. United States, 271 U. S. 494, 46 Sup. Ct 566 (1920), noted
(1927) 12 CoRN. L. Q. 216, (1927) 21 ILL. L. Rnv. 641; Commonwealth
v. Smith, 163 Mass. 411, 40 N. E. 189 (1895) ; People v. Prevost, 219 Mlich.
233, 189 N. W. 92 (1922); Sanders v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 150, 105 S.
W. 803 (1907). Contra: Parrott v. State, 125 Tenn. 1, 139 S. W. 1056
(1911). See Mass. Gen. Laws (1920) c. 278, § 23 (forbidding infer-
ence from or reference to such former refusal to testify).
42 Michigan allows it. People v. Prevost, supra note 41. Contra: New-
man v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky. L. R. 81, 88 S. W. 1039 (1905); Wilson v.
State, 54 Tex. Cr. App. 505, 113 S. W. 529 (1908).
43 Suprai note 13. State v. Ryan, supra note 16 (new trial irrespective
of whether defendant is prejudiced); Nowlin v. State, 7 Okla. Cr. App. 27,
121 Pac. 791 (1912). But cfb Davis v. State, 16 kla. Cr. App. 377, 182
Pac. 909 (1919) (no new trial ordered on appeal where improper remarks
do not appear of record and were not objected to). Query whether this
provision has not been nullified by the "harmless error" statute. Okla.
Comp. Stat. (1921) § 2822; Williams v. State, 249 Pac. 433 (Okla. Cr. App.
1926) (violation of statute by improper question to jury on their voir dire
held not to require new trial).
4Rowe v. State, 87 Fla. 17, 98 So. 613 (1924); Angelo v. People, 9G
Ill. 209 (1880); State v. Tennison, 42 Kan. 330, 22 Pac. 429 (18S9); State
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been held to be waived in these jurisdictions by the defendant's
allowing the case to proceed without moving to withdraw it from
the jury. In the view of these courts, fatal and irreparable harm
is done the defendant by the fact that the jury's attention has
once been called to his not offering himself as a witness." The
more general holding seems to be, however, that the impropriety
is not reversible error where it has not been prejudicial to the de-
fendant, 4oand a proper and timely instruction by the court is
deemed to cure any prejudicial effect.47  Withdrawal of the ob-
jectionable remark by the prosecuting attorney and a rebuke of
that officer by the court has been held to accomplish the same re-
sult.48. It is not clear, even under the more liberal majority rule,
whether or not the accused is entitled to a new trial if he moves
to have the case withdrawn from the jury as soon as the impro-
priety occurs.49 But it is a-waiver of whatever such right the de-
fendant may have to allow the trial to proceed after an objection
has been sustained to the remark, 0 unless the appellate court
feels that the defendant was substantially prejudiced. If, after
objection by the defendant, the court allows counsel for the state
v. Robinson, 112 La. 939, 36 So. 811 (1904),; Gurley v. State, 101 bIss.
190, 57 So. 565 (1911); State v. Garrington, 11 S. D. 178, 76 N. W. 326
(1898); Haley v. State, 84 Tex. Cr. App. 629, 209 S. W. 675 (1919).
45 See Angelo v. People, supra note 44, at 213.
46 State v. Buxton, 79 Conn. 477, 65 Atl. 957 (1907); State v. Ahern, 54
Minn. 195, 55 N. W. 959 (1893) ; Hardesty v. State, 95 Neb. 839, 146 N. W.
1007 (1914); Price v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 393 (1883). And see State
v. Monahan, 96 Conn. 289, 291, 114 Atl. 102, 103 (1921).
In Minnesota the court will not assume the error to have been harmless
unless the evidence is practically conclusive. State v. Richman, 143 Minn.
314, 173 N. W. 718 (1919) (reversal although evidence is "amply suffi-
cient").
47 Brooks v. United States, 8 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925); Com-
monwealth v. Festo, 251 Mass. 275, 146 N. E. 700 (1925); People v. Shader,
326 Ill. 145, 157 N. E. 225 (1927) (apparently contra to earlier Illinois
cases, supra note 44). Petite v. People, 8 Colo. 518, 9 Pac. 622 (1885) ; State
v. Buxton, supra note 46; Blume v. State, 154 Ind. 343, 56 N. E. 771
(1900) ; People v. Hess, supra note 15; State v. Fitzgerald, 130 Mo. 407,
32 S. W. 1113 (1895); State v. Anderson, 10 Or. 448 (1882); State v.
Hull, 18 R. I. 207, 26 Atl. 191 (1893); State v. Chisnell, 36 W. Va. 659;
15 S. E. 412 (1892); Dunn v. State, 118 Wis. 82, 94 N. W. 646 (1903).
For a statement as to adequacy and timeliness of charge, see State v.
Monahan, supra note 46, at 295, 114 Atl. at 104.
4sPeople v. Kromphold, 172 Cal. 512, 157 Pac. 599 (1916); State v. Tay-
lor, 134 Mo. 109, 35 S. W. 92 (1896); State v. Tucker, 190 N. C. 708, 130
S. E. 720 (1925).
49 Davis v. State, 197 Ind. 448, 151 N. E. 329 (1926) (prompt motion
to withdraw case from jury held erroneously denied. It does not appear
from this case that an instruction would have sufficed after such a motion).
Contra: Commoiiwealth v. Worcester, 141 Mass. 581 6 N. E. 700 (1886)
(proper remedy said to be by objection and instruction).
50 State v. Buxton, supra note 46; Stone v. State, 105 Ala. 60, 17 So. 114
(1894); Coleman v. State, 111 Ind. 563, 13 N. E. 100 (1887).
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to continue to comment upon the failure of the accused to testify,
or fails to take suitable measures, a new trial will be granted.51
In Mfaine and California the original statutes qualifying the
accused in a criminal case to testify if he so elected did not forbid
an inference from his neglect or refusal to testify.*2 The courts
in the former state consistently held that the failure of the ac-
cused to testify did raise a presumption in favor of his guilt
which the court in its charge to the jury properly might urge
them to consider.53 There is no case on the privilege of the pros-
ecuting attorney to urge this presumption in his argument but
it seems to have been understood that this also was proper.5 '
By the California court, on the other hand, such reference in ar-
gument was deemed to be an infraction of that part of the statute
which reenacted the constitutional guaranty against self incrim-
ination. 5 In Georgia it is improper for either the court uo or the
state's attorney 57 to suggest that a presumption of the defend-
ant's guilt is raised by his silence. And it is reversible error for
the trial court to deny a motion for a mistrial on the occurrence
of such an argument.-' But the defendant cannot take advantage
of it where, in the absence of such a motion, the court gives a
proper instruction. 9  The rule in South Carolina seems to be
similar. o
In New Jersey the statute qualifying the accused to testify
did not preclude the propriety of drawing an adverse inference
from a neglect or refusal to avail himself of the privilege.5' The
rule in that state, established by a long line of decisions, is that
where the state's evidence "tends to establish facts which if true
would be conclusive of his (the defendant's) guilt of the crime
51 Spears v. State, 114 So. 477 (Ala. 1927) (court allowed prosecuting
attorney to continue to comment); People v. Minkowitz, 220 N. Y. 399, 115
N. E. 987 (1917) (court neither struck out reference nor gave instruction) ;
State v. Humphrey, 186 N. C. 533, 120 S. E. 85 (1923) ; Commonwealth v.
Green, 233 Pa. 291, 82 Atl. 250 (1912) (not clear that court was asked to
take action); State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555 (1868) (reversal where court
refused to check comment, but gave instruction).
r2 See supra notes 3 and 4.
53 State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200 (1867); State v. Lawrence, 57 Me. 574
(1870) ; State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298 (1871).
54 See State v. Banks, supra note 31, at 491, 7 Atl. at 270.
55 People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522 (1869).
56 Bird v. State, 50 Ga. 585 (1874).
S7Robinson v. State, 82 Ga. 535, 9 S. E. 528 (1889).
58 Minor v. State, 120 Ga. 490, 48 S. E. 198 (1904).
59Robinson v. State, supra note 57; O'Dell v. State, 120 Ga. 152, 47 S.
E. 577 (1904).
60 State v. Pendarvis, 88 S. C. 548, 71 S. E. 45 (1911) (comment by
state's attorney improper but not ground for new trial unless verdict was
thereby influenced).
61 N. J. Laws (1871) c. 40, p. 12. This provision is now N. J. Comp.
Stat. (1910) (Cr. Proc.) § 57.
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charged against him, and where he can disprove them by his
own oath-as a witness, if the facts be not true, then his silence
would justify a strong inference that he could not deny the
charges." 62 And the court may, by comment on this failure to
testify, urge the suggested inference to the jury 3 The fact that
the evidence against the prisoner is all circumstantial does not
seem to take away the judge's privilege to comment,0 4 although
it does not justify language as emphatic as in other cases."
There seems to be no case upholding, or denouncing, the action
of a prosecuting attorney in this respect.
In passing upon the New Jersey practice, just discussed, the
United States Supreme Court held that, even if it were a viola-
tion of the privilege against self-crimination to allow an infer-
ence to be drawn from the defendant's silence, there was no
federal question presented, as the National Constitution did not
guarantee that privilege to those on trial in the state courts.10
The privilege is provided for, however, by the constitutions of all
but two of the states, and in one of these it is guaranteed by
statute, in the other by judicial decision.67
The direct holdings on the question of state constitutionality
are, of course, few, since comment was forbidden' by statute in
most of the states. The court of Maine decided directly that the
constitutional privilege could be reconciled with allowing an
inference to be urged and drawn from failure to testify.', The
cases in New Jersey and England 69 hold that such an inference
is not subversive of the privilege against self-crimination. On
the other hand the decisions in Georgia, South Carolina 10 and
62 Magie, C. J., in Parker v. State, 61 N. J. L. 308, 313, 39 At]. 051, 653
(1898).
03 Parker v. State, supra note 62; State v. Banusik, 84 N. J. L. 640, 64
Atl. 994 (1906) (comment in case where defendant rested after close of
state's case, for purpose of getting directed verdict); State v. Rubenstein,
136 Atl. 597 (N. J. 1927).
64 State v. Conners, 87 N. J. L. 419, 94 Ati. 812 (1915).
65 State v. Wines, 65 N. J. L. 31, 46 At]. 702 (1900) (words "natural
and irresistible inference," quoted from opinion of Magie, C. J., in Parker
v. State, supra note 62, held too strong in such a case) ; ef. State v. Kisik,
99 N. 3. L. 385, 125 Atl. 239 (1923) (charge that jury could place such
importance "as they saw fit" held improper).
6 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908) (Harlan,
J., dissenting). The authority of this case does not seem to have been
questioned.
67New Jersey and Iowa. The privilege is guaranteed by statute in New
Jersey and by judicial decision in Iowa. N. J. Comp. Stat. (1910) (Evi-
dence) § 8; State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N. W. 935 (1902) (pri~ilege
read by implication into "due process" clause).
OState v. Bartlett, supra note 53; State v. Cleaves, supra note 53.
69 Parker v. State, supra note 62; Regina v. Rhodes, supra note 29.
70 Foi Georgia and South Carolina cases, see supra notes 56-60.
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California (under the original provision) - take exactly the oppo-
site view. Dicta in other cases characterize the statutory prohi-
bition of the inference of guilt as a mere carrying out of the
constitutional guaranty.72  Where this question has been dis-
cussed by writers on the subject, the view generally expressed
by them seems to be that the permission of comment is incom-
patible with the privilege, on the ground that such permission
virtually compels a defendant to testify, even though it crimin-
ates him. 3 It is also significant, perhaps, that when the statutory
rule was changed in Ohio, the change was effected by a constitu-
tional amendment.74  This was sought to be done in Mlassachu-
setts also, but met with no success. 2  In Wisconsin, however.
those favoring an alteration of the same rule apparently thought
an act of the legislature sufficient.7
Recent recommendations by crime surveys and committees
charged with the investigation of criminal conditions and proced-
ure have frequently suggested that the prosecutor be allowed to
comment on the failure of the accused to testify.77  The rule
forbidding such comment, it is said, is a relic of the time when
the accused was incompetent to testify7 8 The retention of it is
the result of that unfortunate attitude which regards a criminal
trial as a contest of skill, rather than as a judicial proceeding to
ascertain the truth, about which no one, presumably, knows
more than the defendant70 It is urged that the jury w ll draw
an adverse inference from the prisoner's silence whether there
is comment on this fact or not.80 The statutory rule is some-
71 People v. Tyler, supra, note 55.
72 See Commonwealth v. Scott, supra note 19, at 240; Commonwealth v.
Harlow, 110 Mlass. 411 (1872); State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555, 565 (1808);
Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213, 222 (1871).
7'3 CooLEY, CONSTrrUTIONAL LIiTrrATIONS (7th ed. 1903) 447, et seq.;
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 19233 § 2272; Note (1917) 15 Alien. L. Rcv.
423.
74 See supra note 9.
75 DEBATES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1917-18) 374.
76 (1912) 2 JoUR. CRIMi. LAW 870.
77Deck, Proposed Reforms in Illinois Cehminal Law and Procedure
(1922) 12 JouR. CRIM. LAW 381, 385; (1912) 2 Joun. Caua. LAW 870
(recommendations of committee on trial procedure, Wisconsin branch);
Report of Special Committee on Law Enforcemcnit (1922) 47 REp. AmI. B~u
ASS'N 424, 431; Reynolds, Proposed Refnz of American Criminal Law
(1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL 368, 371; THE MISsouRI CRIME SURVE'
(1926) 361.
"
8 THE MISSOURI CRIME SuRvEy, supra note 77; Hadley, Crininal Justice
in Amf ricm (1925) 11 AM. BAR ASS'N JoUR. 674.
79 Storey, Practical Suggestions as to the Reform of Criminal Procedure
(1913) 4 JouR. CaRm. LAW 495, 500, et seq.
80 Appleton, C. J., in State v. Cleaves, 59 Ble. 298, 300 (1871) ; Stone, J.,
in Raffel v. United States, 271 U. S. 494, 499, 46 Sup. Ct. 566, 568 (192G) :
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times classed among those technicalities which, it is said, aro
such a bulwark to the accused that the police are tempted to re-
sort to illegal means in order that prisoners may be compelled to
confess.- Many critics also assail the privilege against self
crimination.82
On the other hand, it is pointed out that the hope of getting
confessions in court and the ability to draw inferences from a
prisoner's silence will lead prosecutors to bring people to trial
without preparing careful- cases against them.83 The fact that
a defendant's guilt may not be the only reason for his failure
to testify is often stressed . 4 That the inference is not illogical,
however, is indicated by the fact that it is permitted in civil cases
where a party or his witness avails himself of the privilege.81
VALIDITY OF JUDGMENTS REFUSING RECOGNITION TO CHATTEL
MORTGAGES RECORDED IN ANOTHER STATE
The restatement of the conflict of laws by The American Law
Institute contains the following statement:
"If a chattel is validly mortgaged in accordance with the law
of the state where it is situated at the time of the execution of
the mortgage and is then taken into another state without the
consent of the mortgagee, the interest of the mortgagee is not
thereby divested, nor is it divested as a result of any dealings
with the chattel in the second state until the mortgagee has had a
reasonable opportunity to remove the chattel from the second
state or until the period of prescription in that state has run." I
Note (1917) 15 MICH. L. REv. 423; WIGMORE, loc. Cit. supra note 73 (ex-
cellent discussion of the subject).
81 Knox, Self Incrimination (1925) 74 U. PA. L. REV. 139.
82 Burdick, Criminal Justice in America (1925) 11 Amx. BAR ASS'N Joun.
510, 513; (1920) 13 R EP. ST. BAR ASS'N OF WIS. 225. But see, in behalf
of the privilege: Millar, Modernization of Criminal Procedure (1920) 11
JOUR. CRIm. LAw 344 (recommending, h6wever, that prosecutor be allowed
to comment); Note (1925) 16 JOUR. CRIAIL LAW 165.
83 Cruikshank, Letter (1915) 5 JouR. CRm. LAw 923 (1915). To the
effect that this has not resulted in Ohio see Dunmore, Comment on Failuro
of Accused to Testify (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL 464. This, article
points out that on an actual ballot all the public prosecutors in the state
expressed themselves satisfied with the Constitutional amendment, although
a majority favored a retention of the privilege.
84 WIGMORE, loc. cit. supra note 73; HINTON, CASES ON EVIDENCE (1919)
239, n. 13.
85 Hudson v. Jordan, 108 N. C. 10, 13 S. E. 1029 (1891); United States
v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (suit to cancel an
oil lease in the Fall-Doheny affair. It is interesting to note that the silence
of these same men as to the same general fact situation was unavailable
as an inference against them on their criminal prosecution).
'AmERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE, CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT No. 3, §
288. In a subsequent section (§ 295), the rule for conditionally sold chat-
tels is laid down in similar terms. .Both of these sections are merely par-
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It may be conceded at the outset that by far the greater num-
ber of courts have held that the interests of mortgagees under
these circumstances will be protected in the state of the forum,
even though there has been no attempt to comply with the local
recording acts. It is the group of cases which for one reason
or another refuses recognition to the "foreign mortgage" that
raises doubts as to the validity of the rule in the Restatement.
While these cases are, perhaps, relatively few in number, none
of them have been taken to the Supreme Court on appeal.2
Let us select a typical case from one of the minority holdings
and consider the issues which it raises.3 An automobile, validly
mortgaged in Texas, was, without the knowledge or consent of
the mortgagee, taken to Wisconsin and there immediately sold to
the defendant, a purchaser for value and without notice. In an
action brought in Wisconsin by the mortgagee against this pur-
chaser it was held that the recognition of the Texas mortgage
was solely a matter of comity and that, since Texas did not rec-
ognize foreign mortgages, Wisconsin would not recognize the
Texas mortgage. It is not intended to debate the question of the
desirability of such a decision, but rather to consider its validity
as distinguished from its expediency. Having exercised juris-
diction what is the effect of the judgment? Section 52 of the
Restatement,4 read in connection with section 43,0 would appear
to tell us that it would be of no force in any other state, and
ticularizations of the broad generalization to be found in § 52 that:
"If a chattel belonging to a person who is not a citizen of or domiciled
in the state, is brought into the state without his consent, the state has
no jurisdiction over his title to the chattel until he has had a reasonable
opportunity to remove it or until the period of prescription has run."
2 Union Securities Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513 (1923);
Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 Pac. 887 (1921) ; Bank v. Carr, 15 Pa.
Super. 346 (1900) ; Boydson v. Goodrich, 49 Mlich. 65, 12 N. W. 913 (1882) ;
Delop & C6. v. Windsor, 26 La. Ann. 185 (1874); Consolidated Garage Co.
v. Chambers, 111 Tex. 293, 231 S. W. 1072 (1921); Farmer v. Evans,
II1 Texas 283, 233 S. W. 101 (1921); Crosby v. Huston, 1 Tex. 203 (184G).
There are also a number of cases decreeing the forfeiture of automobiles
used for carrying liquor, though they were validly mortgaged in some
state other than the forum and were taken out of that state and used in
liquor traffic against the express provisions of the mortgage. State v.
Morris, 257 Pac. 731 (Kan. 1927); State v. Stephens, 109 Kan. 254, 198
Pac. 1087 (1921); Robinson Cadillac Motor Co. v. Ratekin, 104 Neb. 369,
177 N. W. 337 (1920); Pennington v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 803, 102 S.
E. 758 (1920) (Virginia by Amended Acts (1922) c. 345, § 1, now pro-
tects the interest of the owner, lienor, mortgagee, etc.).
3 Union Securities Co. v. Adams, supra note 2.
4 Supra note 1.
5 Section 43 reads "As used ii this Subject, the word jurisdiction means
the powei of a state to create rights which under the principles of the
common law will be recognized as valid in other states."
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section 288 6 is susceptible of the construction that it would be
inoperative even in Wisconsin. Unfortunately, there is no direct
authority on either of these questions.7
Is the judgment of no validity in Wisconsin? If this be so it
must be either because of some "fundamental, immutable prin-
ciple" of jurisdiction in the conflict of laws flowing from the
"nature of law and legal rights," 8 or it must be because of the
Federal Constitution.9
The assumption that there is always some one and only "law"
which has jurisdiction or power to attach legal consequences to
a given situation in the conflict of laws and that when the "ap-
propriate law" has created rights their validity cannot be im-
peached has been subjected to severe attack.1° In its place
attention has been directed to what the courts have actually
done. No doubt, as Professor Cook so clearly points out,11 the
existing rules of positive law often do not authorize a court to
deal with a particular situation, and in this sense the court has
6 Supra note 1.
7 The case of Edgerly v. Bush, 81 N. Y. 199 (1880) has been cited as
authority in favor of the Restatement. Beale, Jurisdiction over Titlo of
Absent Owner in a Chattel (1927) 40 HARV. L. RE. 805. In that case
horses validly mortgaged to plaintiff in New York were taken to Canada
and sold to defendant. Under Canadian market ouvert principles the de-
fendant got good title, but when he brought the horses back to New York
the plaintiff was allowed to recover them. The peculiar facts should be
noted, however. If the New York court had recognized the Canadian
market-ouvert they would have defeated their own chattel mortgage act.
The case cannot be considered as direct authority, nor is the question of
a judgment of a sister state, entitled to full faith and credit under the
Constitution, before the court. Cf. Fuller v. Webster, 5 Boyce (Del.) 538,
95 At. 335 (1915), aff'd 99 Atl. 1069, where an automobile, condition-
ally sold by plaintiff in Massachusetts was taken to Pennsylvania and sold
to defendant. In an action of replevin brought in Delaware it was held
that, even though Delaware follows Massachusetts and protects the con-
ditional vendor against a bona fide purchaser, the purchase should be
governed by Pennsylvania law which did not recognize a conditional sale
valid where made. The case is weakened as authority by the fact that it
does not appear whether or not the conditional vendor had forbidden the
removal of the car from Massachusetts.
8 Those who adopt the "territorial" theory of law contend that from the
essential nature of law flow fundamental principles which dictate the
choice of "law" and this appropriate law is the only one with "jurisdiction"
to attach legal consequences to a given situation. Beale, Summary of The
Conflicts of Laws, in 3 CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWs (1902) 501, 517.
9 E. M. Dodd, The Power of The Supreme Court to Review State Deci-
sions in the Field of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 531.
10 Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33
YALE LAW JOURNAL 457; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the
Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL 736; Yntema, The Horn-
book Method and the Conflict of Laws (1928) 37 YALE LAiW JOUnNAL 468,
474 et seq.
1 Cook, op. cit. supra note 10, at 462.
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"no jurisdiction." This is, however, quite a different thing from
erecting the rules of positive law into a principle limiting the
power of a state to authorize its courts to apply its own rules
to the problem. A consideration of cases will show that courts
have actually operated in opposition to supposed principles of
conflicts without successful objection. 2 It is clear that the Wis-
consin court in the case above conceived itself to be governed in
the selection of the rule it chose solely by its own positive law
and not by the essential nature of the jurisdictional principles
of the conflict of laws.
Granting, therefore, that the assumption of jurisdiction and
the application of its rules by Wisconsin are not rendered void
by any "immutable principle," are they in violation of either the
"full faith and credit" or the "due process" clauses of the Fed-
eral Constitution? It has been insisted that such a course could
violate both sections. It would be said that, in refusing recogni-
tion to the Texas mortgage Wisconsin did not give full faith and
credit to the Texas statute which by the principles of the con-
flict of laws alone was applicable to the situation, and that the
plaintiff, having acquired a "vested right" would be denied due
process when recognition was refused. 13
Under the assumption that there are no principles of conflicts
that demand that Texas "law" and only Texas law can attach
legal consequences to this situation, there is no necessity that
full faith be accorded the Texas recording acts. What has been
termed the "local law" theory would remove any question of
denial of full faith by pointing out that there is in reality no
"Texas right" involved, but instead, the remedy and therefore
the right must be created by the forum, and, since the Texas re-
cording act is only a domestic rule, its validity is not denied if
it is considered by the forum as merely a fact worthy of con-
sideration as one of the factors leading to the selection of a de-
sirable rule. 4
The proposition that due process is denied by the refusal to
apply Texas law must be supported in the light of the long es-
tablished rule that judicial error is not a deprivation of due
process. 5 It has been said that a different rule should be ap-
plied in conflicts cases because under the "vested rights" theory
a judicial error in conflicts decisions involves not only local law
12 Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1 (1869); cf. State v. Carter,
3 Dutcher (N. J. 1859) 499; Cook, op. cit. supra note 10, at 463 and cases
cited; Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 10, at 741 and cases cited.
13 E. Al. Dodd, op. cit. spra note 9.
14 See Yntema, op. cit. supra note 10, at 478.
- Milwaukee Elec. Light Co. v. Wisconsin, 252 U. S. 100, 40 Sup. CL
306 (1920); Paterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 27 Sup. Ct. 556 (1907);
Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 16 Sup. Ct. 80 (1895).
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but "foreign rights." 1c Under the more tenable local law theory
there can be no basis for such discrimination against conflicts
cases since there is in reality no foreign right enforced or denied
by the forum. The position that there is no deprivation of due
process or denial of full faith in refusing to recognize the foreign
statute or, if there be one, the foreign right, seems to be sup-
ported by the decisions of the Supreme Court, although they
have often been confusing in language.17 State courts appear to
be as free from constitutional restrictions as in deciding any
other question of local law, unless the case presents an instance
of a state act of specific direction 18 which must be accorded full
faith, but they are no freer than in deciding questions of local
law and will not be permitted to do things otherwise uncon-
stitutional I' or manifestly unfair.20
16 It has been suggested that, whereas the refusal to recognize the Texas
statute, might constitute a denial of due process, the application of Wis-
consin law would really do so because a vested right is denied. If it be
borne in mind that no "foreign right" is involved, this tenous distinction
may be discarded since neither constitutes a denial of due process. Cf. in-
fra note 17.
17Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U. S. 171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34 (1916), has never been
overruled. The court dismissed that case saying: "The most that the
plaintiff in error can say is that the state court made a mistaken application
of the doctrine of the conflict of laws in deciding that the cancellation of
a land contract is governed by the law of the itus instead of the place
of making and'performance. But that, being purely a question of local
common law, is a matter with which this court is not concerned." It has
been said that the Supreme Court has, however, receded somewhat from
this position and has to some extent made itself "a tribunal for bringing
about uniformity in the field of the conflict of laws." E. M. Dodd, op.
cit. supra note 8, at 560. It is submitted that the cases relied upon to
establish this new attitude fall into two well-defined groups: (1) those
involving the rights and obligations of members or stockholders in a corpor-
ate body, (2) those involving attempts by states to take unfair advantage
of foreign corporations which, because such corporations are not engaged
in interstate commerce, they had the power to exclude from doing business
within their borders. "In these situations, strong economic and govern-
mental motives are in operation behind the formulae, so that from the
practical point of view it would at the present time be unsafe and unsound
to generalize the dicta in these decisions into a theory of unlimited federal
competence in the field of the conflicts of laws." Yntema, op. cit. supa
note 10, at 482. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U. S. 542, 34
Sup. Ct. 955 (1914), would appear to be outside the above categories. It
should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court pointed out that the action
of the South Carolina court there amounted to an attempt to regulate
interstate commerce. That, coupled with the fact that the decision was not
conceived to stand in the way of Kryger v. Wilson, supra, two years later,
would appear to make it undesirable to take this case at its face value.
Cf. Comment (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOuRNAL 405.
18 Such gets might be judgments or decrees of courts, corporate charters,
etc.
19 See the discussion of interference with the interstate commerce in
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, supra note 17.
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The belief, then, that there are no pre-existing principles de-
manding the application of a certain "law," and the further prop-
osition that the forum does not violate constitutional provisions,
since it creates the remedy and right rather than enforces or
denies foreign rights, explains in the simplest way the actual
results achieved by the cases. One should not completely accept
a theory which does not reconcile with its major premise the
fact that these cases are on the books and that courts have exer-
cised jurisdiction, slaughtering "foreign rights" without protest.
Since these judgments are not impeachable for either of the
reasons considered above, it is submitted that they are them-
selves entitled to full faith and credit in the other states of the
Union.21
Were the question one of the desirability of protecting the
mortgagee, perhaps few would quarrel with the Restatement.
When, however, "jurisdiction" is denied to those courts which
do not do so, it appears that a positive rule which most courts
have elected to follow has been transformed into a permanent
and everlasting "principle" which all -must follow.
THE DOCTRINE OF PAIN V. PACKAIRD
After a guaranteed note becomes due, the creditor who does
not wish immediately to force payment has many difficulties.
It is often necessary to grant a moratorium to a debtor who is
temporarily embarrassed, or else to run the chance of forcing
him into bankruptcy. And yet the creditor who does not wish to
force immediate payment must act cautiously if he is to avoid any
action which will discharge his surety. For example, he will lose
the surety if without the latter's consent he makes a "binding"
contract for an extension of time, or other important changes
in the contract. If he only decides not to push collection of the
debt for a time, a nervous surety may in many states, by the doc-
trine of Pain v. Packard, force him to choose between suing the
principal immediately, thus jeopardizing future business rela-
tions with him, and the alternative of losing his security.
Viewed on the whole, it often seems that the surety's function
in law is to be discharged.
Concisely stated, the doctrine of Pain v. Packard is, that after
the debt is due the surety may notify the creditor to sue the prin-
2o As, for example, in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dunken, 2GG U. S. 389,
45 Sup. Ct. 129 (1924).
21 Clearly if no "principles" of the conflict of laws nor the Federal Consti-
tution prevent it, when the mortgagee pursues the property into the forum
and there institutes suit., the forum has jurisdiction and any judgment ren-
dered must be given full faith and credit in sister states. Mills v. Duryee, 7
Cranch. (U. S.) 481 (1813). The forfeiture cases, supm note 2, are pro-
ceedings in ren and must also be given full faith, Cooper v. Reynolds,
10 Wall. (U. S.) 308 (1870).
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cipal immediately, the penalty for noncompliance being the dis-
charge of the surety, either absolutely or to the extent to which
such 'noncompliance prejudicied him.1 This doctrine has been
criticized by many courts and as a result has been in some re-
spects limited in scope. It is the law in many states, and it has
been much favored by laymen, probably because it is not gen-
erally known that the surety can always, if he wishes, pay the
debt and sue the principal himself,2 or exercise his right of ex-
oneration in equity. Contrary to the general impression, the
doctrine was first formulated by a Virginia statute in 1794.2
Tennessee passed a similar statute in 1801.4 In the same year
the doctrine was considered but not applied in Pennsylvania,
although there was no court of equity, and hence the surety
could not avail himself of exoneration.-' Fifteen years later the
New York Supreme Court independently stated the doctrine and
'In most states the surety is discharged absolutely by the creditor's
failure to sue, but he is discharged only to the extent to which he is prej-
udiced, by the statutes of California, Montana, Oklahoma, North Dakota,
and South Dakota. In Missouri, if suit is not brought after notice, the
surety is discharged in full to the creditor whom he nptified. See statutes
infra notes 9 and 11.
2 Alabama has thought this not sufficient protection to the surety. "To
say that a security should always pay the debt and resort to the principal
for his indemnity would often without sufficient reason lay on him a bur-
den too hard to be borne." Bruce v. Edwards, 1 Stew. 11, 12 (Ala. 1827).
It really depends on who one thinks should bear the cost of the debtor's
failing to keep his promise.
3 Va. Rev. Code (1803) 323: "That when any person or persons shall
hereafter become bound as security or securities . . . for the payment
of money or tobacco, and shall apprehend that his or their principal debtor
or debtors is or are likely to become insolvent . . . it shall and may be
lawful for such security . . . to require by notice in writing of his
or their creditor or creditors, forthwith to put the bond, bill, or note
. . . in suit; and unless the creditor or creditors . . . shall in a
reasonable time commence an action . . . the creditor or creditors
. . . shall thereby forfeit the right . . . to demand and receive
the amount of the money or tobacco which may be due by such
bond, bill or note."
4 Tenn. Laws (Scott, 1821) 705. Later cases indicate that a similar prac-
tice existed in equity irrespective of a statute. Hancock v. Bryant, 2 Yerg.
476 (Tenn. 1830).
G "To delay bringing a suit against the principal, when required thereto
by the surety, or his representative, who might have more correct channels
of information than the creditor, would be highly unjust." Dehuff v. Tur-
bett, 3 Yeates 157, 159 (Pa. 1801). But at page 162 the court said:
"Upon the whole, sitting as a court of law, we cannot say that a creditor
neglecting to sue his principal debtor, on the requisition of his surety
thereby discharges his surety in general; and we think it will require great
consideration before such a rule is adopted." The court was not required
to pass on the point, because the principal was at the time of notice a
Congressman and not subject to suit. For an explanation of Pennsyl-
vania's special position, see Cope v. Smith, 8 S. & R. 110, 115 (Pa. 1822).
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gave it its name.0 Chancellor Kent soon attempted to revive the
common law rule," but he was overruled on appeal, the deciding
vote being that of a layman." Thereafter many states adopted
the doctrine by statutes, but courts were loathe to adopt it by
judicial decision. At the present time eighteen states have the
rule by statute; 9 three states have it by judicial decision;20
five states have a special type of statute under which the surety
may require the creditor to pursue any remedy which he has
against the principal debtor which is not accorded the surety
directly, but some of the courts have practically construed this
into the common law rule; - the situation is doubtful in one
state;'- sixteen states have refused to adopt the rule; '1 while
in five states the point has seemingly not arisen.1 4
6 Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174 (N. Y. 1816).
7King v. Baldwin and Fowler, 2 Johns. Ch. 554 (N. Y. 1817).8 King v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384 (N. Y. 1819).
9 Ala. Civ. Code (1923) §§ 9555-9557; Ariz. Civ. Code (1913) §§ 4366,
4357; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford, 1921) §§ 2S7-329; Ga. Ann. Code
(1926) § 3546; Il. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1927) c. 132, §§ 1, 2; Ind. Ann.
Stat. (Burns, 1926) §§ 1288, 1289; Iowa Code (1927) §9 9457, 9.158; Ky.
Stat. (Carroll, 1922) § 4668; Miss. Ann. Code (Hemingway, 1927) § 3109;
Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) §§ 12687-12692; N. C. Cons. Stat. (1919) §§ 3967-
8969; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1926) §§ 12191-12103; Tenn. Ann. Code
(Shannon, 1918) §§ 3517-3520; Tex. Ann. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1914) Art.
6329; Va. Gen. Laws Ann. (1923) § 5774, 5775; Wash. Comp. Stat. (Rem-
ingtbn, 1922) c. 9, §§ 974, 975; W. Va. Code Ann. (Barnes, 1923) c. 101,
§§ 1, 2; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1920) §§ 6293-6295.
10 Pain v. Packard, supra note 6; Lichenthaler v. Thompson, 13 S. & R.
157 (Pa. 1825); Martin v. Skehan, 2 Colo. 614 (1S75); see Cope v. Smith,
supra note 5, at 116.
1 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1928) §§ 2840, 2845; Mont. Rev. Code (Choate,
1921) §§ 8201, 8203; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) §§ 6631, 6683; Okla.
Rev. Laws (1921) §§ 5153, 5155; S. D. Rev. Code (1919) §§ 1501, 1506,
1507; Smith v. Freyler, 4 Mont. 489, 1 Pac. 214 (1882) (surety held; Pain
v. Packard criticized). But cf. Bailey Loan Co. v. Seward, 9 S. D. 326, 69
N. W. 58 (1896). In Oklahoma the court inferred that since the surety
could pay the cieditor and himself sue the principal, he was not ordering
the creditor to do something which he could not do himself within the
terms of the statute. Cf. Palmer v. Noe, 48 Okla. 450, 150 Pac. 462 (1915).
Cf. also, National Bank v. Lowrey, 57 Okla. 304, 157 Pac. 103 (1916)
(action by surety to recover what bank had subtracted from his account;
held for creditor as only oral notice given); Miller v. State, 52 Okla. 76,
152 Pae. 409 (1915) (same); Gregg v. Okla. State Bank, 72 Okla. 193, 179
Pac. 613 (1919) (same); Union Mlutual Ins. Co. v. Page, 65 Okla. 101, 164
Pac. 116 (1917).
12 The rule has never been applied in Kansas, but two cases where notice
had been given have come up, and the court then said that the surety would
be discharged if the creditor, when asked, refused either to sue the prin-
cipal himself or to alloiv the surety to do so in his name. See Turner v.
Hale, 8 Kan. 38 (1871) (notice given, but no proof that creditor did not
comply); Ingals v. Sutliff, 36 Ran. 444, 13 Pac. 823 (18S7) (oral notice).13 Bull v. Allen, 19 Conn. 101 (1848); Wilds v. Atti x, 4 Del. Ch. 253
(1871); Boutte v. Martin, 16 La. 133 (1840); Eaton v. Waite, 66 Mle. 221
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The courts which have once adopted the rule have often tended
to limit it. The Oklahoma statute as mentioned above has seem-
ingly been entirely construed away by its court. Other jurisdic-
tions have limited the kind of contract to which the doctrine ap-
plies. The statutes in Missouri and other states except official
bonds; 1 5 New York and Ohio require the suretyship agreement
to be part of the principal contract. 6 The terms of the contract
(1877); Frye v. Barker, 21 Mass. 382 (1826); Inkster v. First National
Bank, 30 Mich. 148 (1874); Huey v. Pinney, 5 Minn. 310 (1861); Davis
v. Huggins, 3 N. H. 231 (1825); Kemp Lumber Co. v. Stanley, 22 N. M.
198, 160 Pac. 351 (1916); Findley v. Hill, 8 Or. 247 (1880); Snow v. Hor-
gan, 18 R. I. 289, 27 AtI. 338 (1893); Caston v. Dunlap, Rich Eq. Cas.
77 (S. C. 1831); Hubbard v. Davis, 1 Aik. 296 (Vt. 1826); Harris v. New-
ell, 42 Wis. 687 (1877); see Bank of Maywood v. Estate of McAllister, 56
Neb. 188, 189, 76 N. W. 552, 553 (1898); of. Walmer v. First Acceptance
Co. 192 Wis. 800, 212 N. W. 638 (1927) (indorser); Lennox v. Prout, 3
Wheat. 520 (U. S. 1818) (applying Dist. of Col. law). There is an early
New Jersey case applying the doctrine, but this has since been overruled.
Manning v. Shotwell, 5 N. J. L. 584 (1819) (notice; suit discontinued on
part payment; surety discharged); Pintard v. Davis, 21 N. J. 632 (1846)
(notice; Pain v. Packard expressly repudiated; surety held).
'14 Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Nevada, and Utah. See Dorman v. Richard,
1 Fla. 281, 295 (1847) : "As to this objection [creditor's lack of diligence],
we *deem it sufficient to remark that notice to the payee is necessary in
order to release the surety, and that nothing appears on the record to that
effect." But it is very doubtful whether a Florida court would follow this
dictum if such a case came up today.
'5 Jasper County v. Shanks, 61 Mo. 332 (1875) (official bond for safe-
keeping public funds); Johnson County v. Gilkeson, 70 Mo. 645 (1879)
(bond for performance of officer's duties). Contra: Row v. Pulver, 1
Cow. 246 (N. Y. 1823) (bail bond); Montecello v. Cohn, 48 Ark. 254 (1886)
(bond to pay license fee); Hobbs v. Taylor, 11 Ga. App. 679 (1912) (forth-
coming bond); of. Weiler v. Hoch, 25 Pa. 525 (1855) (judgment bond);
see Hickernell's Appeal, 90 Pa. 328, 331 (1879) (same).
The Illinois, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wyoming
statutes expressly except bonds of public officers or those required by
law, while Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wyoming specifically except
bonds of guardians, executors, and administrators, and Missouri also adds
a curator, or other person whose bond secures the performance of the
duties of an office. See statutes cited supra note 9.
I' Morrison v. Equitable Nat. Bank, 6 N. P. 7 (Ohio, 1898); Wells v.
Mann, 45 N. Y. 327 (1871) (surety signs on face of note after its execu-
tion); Newcomb v. Hale, 90 N. Y. 326 (1882) (mortgagee, when selling
mortgage, guarantees payment).
Other contracts held not within the statute: Croughton v. Duval, I Va. 60
(1801) (contract made before the statute passed) ; Fensler v. Prather, 43
Ind. 119 (1873), (partnership note; after paying his half partner asked
other be sued for second half; first partner still responsible); Wilson v.
Tebbetts, 29 Ark. 579 (1874) (principal gave deed of trust to sureties on
property worth more than the debt; sureties had no power of notification,
as they were sufficiently protected without it); Hall v. Equitable Surety
Co., 126 Ark. 535, 191 S. W. 32 (1917) (obliger on an indemnity bond to a
surety company could not give notice to the latter to sue an employee,
principal of the surety company's bond); Fish v. Glover, 154 I1). 86, 39
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-probably without the intent of any of the parties at the time
it was made-have been allowed to neutralize the statute.", The
status of the parties has a great influence on whether or not the
doctrine may be invoked. Although there is conflict, some states
have held that an indorser may not give notice,'5 and the same
has been intimated as to "guarantors." 10 But the executor of a
surety,20 a surety who signs a note as a joint maker, even though
the creditor thinks he is a principal,2 ' or a retired partner,
where another partner carrying on the business has agreed to
pay the old debts,2 2 have been allowed to invoke the doctrine. A
N. E. 1081 (1894) (after a mortgagor had himself sold the mortgaged land,
notice to the mortgagee to proceed against the vendee who had assumed
the mortgage debt held ineffective).
Situations within the doctrine: Lichtenthaler v. Thompson, supra note
10 (lease; notice to go after rent); Prescott Nat. Bank v. Head, 11 Ariz.
213, 90 Pac. 328 (1907) (building contractor's bond); see Dallas Home-
stead & Loan Ass'n. v. Thomas, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 268, 270, 81 S. W. 1041,
1043 (1904) (same).
17 0wensboro Say. Bank v. Haynes, 143 Ky. 534, 136 S. W. 1004 (1911)
("The parties, including makers and indorsers . . . waive . . .
diligence in bringing suit against any party hereto"); Continental & Comm.
Nat. Bank v. Cobb, 200 Fed. 511 (C. C. A. 1st, 1912) (decided under
fllinois law; contract said creditor "may, on such terms as it sees fit, ex-
tend time and alter manner of payment, without notice to" surety). But
cf. Cent. Bank & Trust Co. v. Hill, 160 S. W. 1099 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)
(surety's waiver of notice and presentation for payment did not waive
statute); Martinsburg Bank v. Bunch, 212 Mo. App. 249, 251 S. W. 742
(1923) (note by terms permitted time extension; held not to have con-
templated indefinite delay).
is Trimble v. Thorne, 16 Johns. 152 (N. Y. 1819); Bank of Conway v.
Stary, 51 N. D. 399, 200 N. W. 505 (1924) (accommodation endorser). But
cf. Brooks v. Stevens, 178 S. W%. 30 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (accommodation
endorsement before delivery of note; held a "surety," not a "technical en-
dorser"); Williams v. Ogg & Keith Lumber Co., 42 Tex. Civ. App. 558, 94
S. W. 420 (1906); Cent. Bank & Trust Co. v. Hill, snpra note 17 (accom-
modation endorser). Mississippi by statute permits this technique to
"accommodation endorsers." Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, and West
Virginia by statute permit "endorsers" to give notice. Suepra note 9.
19 See Sample v. Martin, 46 Ind. 226, 227 (1874). Contra: By statute
expressly in Georgia, Virginia and West Virginia. Spra note 9.
20 Clark v. Osborn, 41 Ohio St. 28 (1884). The Ohio and Wyoming stat-
utes specifically apply the doctrine to the surety's executor or administrator,
while Virginia, West Virginia, and Missouri apply it to his "personal rep-
resentative." Sipra note 9. Missouri also provides that if a surety dies
a co-surety may give notice for him.
21 McCoy v. Lockwood, 71 Ind. 319 (1880) (till notice creditor did not
know defendant was a surety); Piper v. Newcomer & Campbell, 23 Iowa
221 (1868); Sullivan v. Dwyer, 42 S. W. 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897); Sisk
v. Rosenberger, 82 Mo. 46 (1884); Meriden Silver Plate Co. v. Flory, 44
Ohio St. 430 (1886). The Kentucky statute, supra note 9, includes a co-
obligor.
2 Colgrove v. Tallman, 67 N. Y. 95 (1876). But of. Fensler v. Prather,
supra note 16.
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co-surety has the same power, but failure to sue after notice does
not by the majority rule discharge his co-surety who had nothing
to do with giving it.-3 The surety who is discharged is under no
duty to contribute to his co-sureties who had to pay and who did
not collect from the principal. 24  The surety will not be dis-
charged if the principal debtor was a non-resident of the state
at the time of notice,25 or if he was a member of Congress then
attending a session in the state, and so exempt from suit.20 The
same situation occurs if the principal dies before the notice is
given, at least until the appointment of an administrator has
given the creditor the chance to file a claim or to sue.27 Texas
23 Martin v. Orr, 96 Ind. 491 (1884); Ramey v. Purvis, 38 Miss. 499
(1860); Routon v. Sacy, 17 Mo. 399 (1853) (two sureties, one giving notice
discharged, other held for one half of debt); Klingensmith v. Klingon-
smith, 31 Pa. 460 (1858) (same); N. C. Cons. Stat. (1919) § 3969; see
Wilson v. Tebbetts, supra, note 16, at 587; Trustees of Schools v. South-
ard, 31 Ill. App. 359, 362 (1889); Bank v. Homesley, 99 N, C. 531, 634
(1888). Contra: Towns v. Riddle, 2 Ala. 694 (1841); Wright v. Stockton,
5 Leigh. 153 (Va. 1834); Georgia .and West Virginia statutes, supra note
9. The Alabama, Arizona, and Mississippi statutes say the "surety giving
such notice shall be discharged."
24-Letcher v. Yantis, 3 Dana 160 (Ky. 1835). But if one surety gives
notice and his co-sureties pay the debt in order to prevent a principal from
being sued, the first surety is responsible to them for contribution. Reliter
v. Cumback, 1 Ind. App. 41, 27 N. E. 443 (1890).
25 Hightower v. Ogletree, 114 Ala. 94, 21 So. 934 (1897); Thompson v.
Freller, 82 Ark. 247, 101 S. W. 174 (1907) (debtor absconded from state);
Georgia statute supra note 9 ("if the principal is within the jurisdiction
of this state"); Davie v. Hatcher, Fed. Cas. No. 7,041 (1871); Conklin v.
Conklin, 54 Ind. 289 (1876); Franklin v. Franklin, 71 Ind. 573 (1880)
(not, pleaded that principal was in the state at time of notice); Missis-
sippi statute, supra note 9 ("the principal if resident within this state") ;
Phillips v. Riley, 27 Mo. 386 (1858); Bostwick v. First Nat. Bank of Nor-
walk, 6 Ohio Cir. Dec. 682 (1895); Seattle Crockery Co. v. Haley & Schram,
6 Wash. 302 (189"); see Warner v. Beardsley, 8 Wend. 194, 199 (N. Y.
1831); of. Sims v. Parks, 32 Ind. 363 (1869) (notice to attach non-resi-
dent's property). Contra: Hayward v. Fullerton, 75 Iowa 371 (1888);
Cox v. Jeffries, 73 Mo. App. 412 (1898) (creditor must make some attempt
to find debtor who is out of state); cf. Hancock v. Bryant, suprm note 4
(property left in state). In Iowa and Illinois the statute implies that
notice may be given only if there is danger of the debtor's insolvency or
leaving the state.
The statute applies even though the creditor is a non-resident. Meriden
Silver Plate Co. v. Flory, supra note 21. In Kentucky a joint judgment
debtor may give notice to the attorney of the non-resident judgment credi-
tor to levy execution but an ordinary surety must serve notice in person
"within the state."
26 Dehuff v. Turbett, supra note 5.
27 The creditor need not sue if the debtor is dead at the time of notice,
or dies within the period for bringing suit. Hickan v. Hollingsworth, 17
Mo. 475 (1853); Davis v. Gillilan, 71 Mo. App. 498 (1897) (letters of
adminikiration granted before notice given); Nat. Bank of Commerce v.
Gilvin, 152 S. W. 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). Indiana holds that notice
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holds that the creditor cannot in any case be forced to pursue the
principal or his representative into the probate court, but the
Missouri statute is contrary.2 8 Iowa allows notice to be given
where the surety merely fears that the principal may become in-
solvent.29 Some jurisdictions, however, require that the surety
show that the principal was solvent at the time of notice, and
has since become insolvent; 3 thus the surety has no power to
force proceedings against the debtor where the latter was in-
solvent at the time that he borrowed the money, and has con-
tinued so ever since.2 1
The courts are inclined to be strict as to the form, source and
destination of the notice. Nearly all jurisdictions adopting the
rule of Pain v. Packard by statute expressly require written
notice; and even in the absence of an express statutory provi-
sion, such states would seem to require that the notice be in
writing.32 Where the doctrine was adopted by judicial decision,
may be given if an administrator has been appointed, but not otherwise.
Franklin v. Franklin, supra note 25 (not shown that plaintiff could have
sued the principal before he died, or that an administrator had been ap-
pointed in the state) ; Whittlesey v. Heberer, 48 Ind. 260 (1874) (no proof
by surety that an administrator had been appointed for the principal);
Daily v. Robinson, 86 Ind. 382 (1882) (creditor, administrator of principal,
failed to get a judgment against himself and the surety; surety dis-
charged). But the creditor does not himself have to get letters of ad-
ministration issued. Brown v. Flanders Bros., S0 Ga. 209 (1887).
28 Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Gilvin, supra note 27; Mo. Rev. Stat.,
supra note 9.
29 First Nat. Bank of Newton v. Smith, 25 Iowa 210 (1868). Iowa and
North Carolina statutes mention this as a possible reason for giving the
notice allowed by the statute. North Carolina also includes danger of the
principal's misconduct.
30 Howle v. Edwards, 97 Ala. 649 (1892) ; Graham v. Rush, 73 Iowa 451
(1887); Marsh v. Dunckel, 25 Hun 167 (N. Y. 1881); Hopkins v. Spur-
lock, 49 Tenn. 152 (1870) (solvency at time of notice not pleaded); Bumpus
v. Lovejoy, 196 S. W. 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); see Jackson v. Huey, 78
Tenn. 184, 192 (1882); Cent. Bank & Trust Co. v. Hill, supra note 17, at
1102 (creditor need not sue if principal notoriously insolvent). Contra:
Reid v. Cox, 5 Blackf. 312 (Ind. 1840).
31 Warner v. Beardsley, supra note 25.
32 Statutes of the following states, supra note 9, speak of written notice:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mlissis-
sippi (forbids a notice not in writing), Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Washington and Wyoming.
The following cases have held that notice must be written: Sims v. Ever-
ett, 113 Ark. 198, 168 S. W. 559 (1914); Brown v. Flanders Bros., aupra
note 27; Ward v. Stout, 32 Ii. 399 (1863) (not pleaded that notice was
written); Miller v. Arnold, 65 Ind. 488 (1879); Nichols v. McDowell, 53
Ky. 5 (1853) (same); Hibler v. Shipp, 78 Ky. 64 (1879); Langdon v.
Markle, 48 Mlo. 357 (1871); Bank v. Homesley, supra note 23; Gregg v.
Okla. State Bank, supra note 11; Brooks v. Stevens, supra note 18; Leazar
v. Menefee, 61 S. W. 438 (Tem. Civ. App. 1901); Bumpus v. Lovejoy, upr7a
note 30; Harmon v. Hale, 1 Wash. Terr. 422 (1874); see Clark v. Osborn,
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however, verbal notice has been permitted,1 though in Pennsyl-
vania there is now a statute forbidding it.34 Intimations have
been made that the creditor may waive written notice,0 but re-
luctance has been shown to construe any action of his into a
waiver-as where a creditor promises to sue, 0 or authorizes the
surety to engage an attorney.3 7 Kentucky provides by statute
that the waiver must be in writing.38 Notice is inoperative be-
fore the debt becomes due,39 or after judgment is recovered in a
suit against the surety alone,40 and of course the surety may
render the notice inoperative by withdrawing it or agreeing to
an extension of time before the statutory period has run.4 ' The
attitude of the courts is particularly noticeable in the strictness
supra note 20, at 35. Contra: Bolton v. Lundy, 6 Mo. 46 (1839) (statute
did not then speak of written notice).
33 Bowling v. Chambers, 20 Colo. App. 113, 77 Pac. 16 (1904) ; Pain v.
Packard, supra note 6; Strickler v. Burkholder, 47 Pa. 476 (1864).
Where the principal debtor was solvent at the time notice was given
and has since become insolvent, Alabama recognizes an exception to the
statute requiring written notice, on the ground that in such a situation
oral notice was always effective at common law. Bruce v. Edwards, supra
note 2; Howle v. Edwards, fupra note 30. Tennessee recognizes an excep-
tion on the same ground in equity. Thompson v. Watson, 10 Yerg. 362
(Tenn. 1837); Jackson v. Huey, supra note 30. Otherwise, oral notice is
ineffective. Miller v. Childress, 21 Tenn. 320 (1841); Kyle v. Fennell, 3
Stew. 9 (Ala. 1830).
34 Pa. Stat. (West, 1920) § 20362; Fidler v. Hershey, 90 Pa. 363 (1879);
First Nat. Bank v. Delone, 254 Pa. 409, 98 Atl. 1042 (1916).
35 Hamblin v. McCallister, 67 Ky. 418 (1868) (written notice waived);
Clark v. Osborn, supra note 20 (orally agreed that written notice on one
note would apply to another with same parties; held waiver of written
notice).
36 Chrisman v. Tuttle, 59 Ind. 155 (1877); Miller v. Arnold, oupra note
32; Hibler v. Shipp, supra note 32; Kittridge v. Stegmier, 11 Wash. 3
(1895). Contra: Taylor v. Davis, 38 Miss. 493 (1860).
37 Leazar v. Menefee, supra note 32.
38 Supra note 9. Mississippi provides that no act of the creditor shall
be a waiver of written notice. Supra note 9.
39 Prescott Nat. Bank v. Head, supra note 16; Armour Fertilizer Works
v. Bond, 139 Ga. 246, 77 S. E. 22 (1913) (after note fell due, but during
an extension, surety having agreed for consideration at time of execution
that creditor "may grant any extension that he deems proper"); Imming
v. Fiedler, 8 Ill. App. 256 (1881); Scales v. Cox, 106 Ind. 261, 6 N. E.
622 (1886); Conrad v. Foy, 68 Pa. 381 (1871); Fidler v. Hershey, supra
note 34. Contra: Lichtenthaler v. Thompson, supra note 10 (default on
rent after extension of lease; notice to distrain for rent; surety dis-
charged).
40 Irwin v. Helgenberg, 21 Ind. 106 (1863). But notice would be effective
after suit is merely begun against the surety. Barnett Bros. v. Alex-
ander, 150 Ark. 478, 234 S. W. 978 (1921); Hammond v. MlcHargue, 170
Mo. App. 497, 156 S. W. 725 (1913) (claim filed in the probate court).
4 Bailey v. New, 29 Ga. 214 (1859); Simpson v. Blunt, 42 Mo. 542
(1868); Weiler v. Hoch, supra note 15; Rotting v. Cleman, 20 Wash. 116,
54 Pac. 935 (1898); Gillilan v. Ludington, 6 W. Va. 128 (1873).
COMMENTS
with which they interpret the language employed, differentiating
between an order and a mere request, and insisting that notice
to be effective must consist of a clear, definite order.42
42 Most statutes say that the surety must tell the creditor to "sue forth-
with." Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee,
Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming, all supra note 9. New
York and Colorado say he must give notice to "enforce collection of the
note by due process of law." Bowling v. Chambers, szpra note 33; Singer
v. Troutman, 49 Barb. 182 (N. Y. 1867). In Pennsylvania and the Ten-
nessee equity courts he may say that "he will consider himself discharged"
unless suit is begun. First Nat. Bank of Hanover v. Delone, aupra note 34;
Jackson v. Huey, supra note 30.
In the following cases the language was held not to constitute notice.
Savage v. Carleton, 33 Ala. 443 (1859) (wish); Baker v. Kellogg, 29 Ohio
St. 663 (1876) (wish); Glenn v. Union Bank v. Trust Co., 150 Ark. 33, 233
S. W. 798 (1921) (advice); Singer v. Troutman, supra (request to "keep
pushing. him"); Lockridge v. Upton, 24 Blo. 184 (1857) ("I won't stand
good any longer"); Williams v. Ogg Lumber Co., supra note 18 ("We
don't intend to pay until forced"); Bank v. Perdue, 3 Ala. 409 (1842)
(notice to foreclose mortgage given by principal); Thompson v. Robinson,
34 Ark. 44 (1879) (notice to attach property of creditor likely to leave the
state; not proved an attachment could then have been made according to
the statute) ; Kennedy v. Falde, 4 Dak. 319 (1886) ("you had better col-
lect the sum"); Bethune v. Dozier, 10 Ga. 235 (1851) (a request rather
than a demand); McMillin v. Deardorff, 18 Ind. App. 423, 48 N. E. 233
(1897) ("sue the note or I will not continue to be responsible as surety";
should say "forthwith"); Frye v. Eisenbiess, 56 Ind. App. 123, 104 N. E.
995 (1914) ("These notes fall due on demand and I want you to enforce
collection or considei my endorsement cancelled"); Kaufman v. Wilson,
29 Ind. 504 (1868) ("express note to Esquire Bennett for collection today.
Don't fail"); Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. McGinnis, 45 Iowa 538 (1877)
(request for copy of bond plus authority to sue) ; Lawson v. Buckley, 49 Hun
329 (N. Y. 1889) ("you must make Daniel come to line this fall"); Hunt
v. Purdy, 84 N. Y. 480 (1880) (collect that mortgage in the spring; do not
let it run over the time it is due"); Maier v. Canavan, 57 How. Pr. 50.1
(N. Y. Coin. Pleas, 1879) ; Porter v. First Nat. Bank, 54 Ohio St. 155, 43 N.
E. 165 (1896) ("Unless you hear from us to the contrary by 10 A. M. to-
morrow, we require you to take judgment on the D. J. McConnell note");
Benge v. Eversole, 156 Ky. 131, 160 S. W. 911 (1913) (letter suggesting
creditor send notes to a certain attorney, and creditor will see that attor-
ney does everything necessary for the collection); Wilson v. Glover, 3 Pa.
404 (1846) (surety notified creditor that he would no longer stand secur-
ity, that principal had sufficient property to meet the bond); Edmonson V.
Potts, 111 Va. 79, 68 S. E. 254 (1910) (surety's administrator wrote let-
ters urging creditor to take such action as was necessary to get deceased's
name off the note) ; see Fensler v. Frather, supra note 10, at 125 ("now if
you think P in any way liable, you will take notice to proceed accordingly
and legally").
In the following cases the language was operative as notice: Franklin
v. Ff'anklin, supra note 25 ("Proceed at once"); Miller v. Gray, 31 Ill. App.
453 (1889) ("Make your money"); Sullivan v. Dyer, supra note 21 ("Use
every effort"); Coykendall v. Constable, 48 Hun 360 (N. Y. 1838); Christy
v. Home, 24 Mlo. 242 (1857) (notice requiring creditor forthwith to com-
mence suit against W. H. and A. H.; not necessary to state which is prin-
cipal and which is surety); Clark v. Osborn, supra note 20 ("you are
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The courts generally incline toward liberal rules concerning
the agency byt, which the notice is given and received. It may
be given by the surety's personal representative 4' or his agent,44
but Pennsylvania has held that his widow,45 the guardian of his
heir,4 or the husband of a legatee of the creditor 47 may not. It
may be given to the creditor's wife 4 or his agent, 4 but two
coirts have held the creditor's husband to be an improper recip-
ient,50 while another court refused to give effect to notice served
on the treasurer of a school board which was the creditor.".
Where there are two payees of a note, notice must be given to
both, 5 2 and where a payee has transferred the note to another,
it must go to the latter.53 The manner of delivery varies from
merely requiring that the notice be left at the creditor's "usual
place of abode," 54 and the surety not keeping a copy," to pro-
hereby requested to commence an action forthwith against
Routon v. Lacy, 17 Mo. 399 (1853) (surety would no longer stand security
unless creditor proceeded against debtor); Hancock v. Bryant, supra note
4 ("I shall expect you to proceed to collect it?').
4' Hammond v. McHargue, supra note 40 (administrator); O'Howell v.
Kirk, 41 Mo. App. 523 (1890); also statutes and case cited supra note 20.
44Wetzel v. Sponsler, 18 Pa. 460 (1852) (surety's son); Klingensmith
v. Klingensmith, supra note 23 (same). The surety's husband may also
give notice. Medley v. Tandy, 85 Ky. 566, 4 S. W. 308 (1887).
45 Gardener v. Ferree, 15 S. & R. 28 (Pa. 1826).
40 Conrad v. Foy, supra note 39.
47 Geddis v. Hawk, 10 S. & R. 33 (Pa. 1823).
'48 McCoy v. Lockwood, supra note 21.
49 Bartlett v. Cunningham, 85 Ill. 22 (1877) ; Wetzel v. Sponsler, supra
note 44; Georgia statute, supra note 9. There is conflict on whether notico
may be served on the creditor's attorney. Thomas v. Mann, 28 Pa. 520
(1857) (notice to attorney sufficient). But cf. Davis v. Snead, 74 Va. 705
(1880) (court receiver is not a "creditor" within the statute; intimation
that creditors whom receiver represents may be notified to proceed).
Contra: Cummins & Feno v. Garretson, 15 Ark. 132 (1854) (notice to
attorney who has the note for collection). Cf. Kentucky statute, supra
note 9.
50 oormann v. Voss, 77 Ohio St. 270, 83 N. E. 76 (1907); Shimer v.
Jones, 47 Pa. 268 (1864).
51 Trustees of Schools v. Southard, supra note 23.
52 Kelly v. Matthews, 5 Ark. 223 (1845). But see Baker v. Kellogg,
29 Ohio St. 663, 665 (1876): "We see no good reason for requiring notice
to more than one of the administrators [of the creditor] in such a case, than
there is for requiring notice to more than one of several joint contractors.
In both cases, we think, notice to one is notice to all."
53 England v. MeKamey, 36 Tenn. 75 (1856). The same where a payee
is debtoi to another who holds the note as security. McCrary v. King &
Dimond, 27 Ga. 26 (1859).
" Missouri Statute, supra note 9. The notice may either be delivered
personally or left at the creditor's house "with some person of the family
over the age of fifteen years." It may not be mailed. Conway v. Camp-
bell, 38 Mo. App. 473 (1889).
5 Lewis v. Warden, 163 Mo. App. 256, 148 S. W. 165 (1912).
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visions that the sheriff must serve it and return the paper to
the surety.50 In most states it is expected that the notice will be
delivered personally.57  Tennessee requires proof of such notice
to be made in court by two witnesses.53
It is usually provided by statutes how soon suit must be started
after proper notice has been given. Three states say it must
be during the next term of court,"0 six within a "reasonable
time," 6o while nine giva limits varying from ten days to three
months21 Delays of five weeks or more have been held to be
unreasonable.2- Indiana has construed the statute to mean get-
ting to trial as soon as possible, so that a suit in the wrong
county, or in the common pleas court rather than in the circuit
court has been held unreasonable delay where a suit brought in
another possible court would have resulted in a trial two months
or more earlier.63  In the same manner, it was held during the
-Civil War that the fact that the nearest court was closed because
of disturbances was no excuse where suit could have been
brought in another county., 4 As to the non-statutory states,
Pennsylvania has held a delay of two months excessive,65 and
one of five days reasonable. c
56 North Carolina statute, supra note 9.
57 Statutes of Kentucky and Missouri, supra note 9. Although only one
case has been found considering the sufficiency of mailing the notice where
the point is not covered by statute, a mailed notice has occasionally been
upheld without that fact being discussed. Hancock v. Bryant, supra note
4; cf. Graham v. Pepple, 132 Mliss. 612, 97 So. 130 (1923). Mailing a notice
has been upheld where the creditor lived a long distance outside the state.
Meriden Silver Plate Co. v. Flory, spra note 21.
58 Statute, supra note 9; Miller v. Childress, supra note 33. But the
provision has been nullified by refusing to apply it in equity. Hancock v.
Bryant, supra note 4 (injunction against enforcing a law judgment).
59 Statutes of Alabama, Kentucky, and Mississippi (the next term, pro-
vided it gives the creditor at least thirty days after notice in which to
bring suit), supra note 9.
60 Statutes of Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio, Washington, and Wyom-
ing, supra note 9.
61 Arizona (60 days), Arkansas (30 days), Georgia (3 months), Iowa
(10 days), Missouri (30 days), North Carolina (same), Tennessee (same),
Virginia (15 days). Where the notice is to issue execution after a judgment
has been recovered, Kentucky allows 10 days. Statutes, supra note 9.62 Miller v. Gray, 31 Ill. App. 453 (1888) (one month and one wee);
Martin v. Orr, supra note 23 (52 days in taking execution); Meriden Sil-
ver Plate Co. v. Flory, supra note 21 (3 months and 6 days).
10 Hamrick v. Barnett, 1 Ind. App. 1, 27 N. E. 100 (1891); Craft v.
Dodd, 15 id. 380 (1860). Other courts have refused to discharge the
surety where the delay from this cause was very slight. Collum v. Luck-
singer, 83 Mo. App. 110 (1900) (one week); Robertson v. Angle, 76 S.
W. 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903) (two weeks).
e4 Cockrill v. Dye, 33 Mo. 365 (1863).
65 Wetzel v. Sponsler, supra note 44.
New York says that for the surety to be discharged the creditor must,
YALE LAW JOURNAL
When the creditor does sue, he must sue all the principalsGT
It is permissible for him to sue the principal and the surety to-
gether, but the creditor is not protected by suing the surety
alone; 68 the principal must be included. Where the principal
has made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, Missouri
says that the creditor must still bring a regular suit, the filing
of a claim against the assignee not being sufficientOt? In Texas
the surety cannot force the creditor to attach the principal's prop-
erty at the time of bringing suit.70 Two courts have lightened
the creditor's burden by saying that if he offers to let the surety
sue, the latter will not be discharged.7- The creditor, having
brought suit, must proceed with due diligence and carry it
through to execution.72 The surety will also be discharged pro
tcanto if the creditor surrenders any of the principal's assets
after he has received notice.7 3
It is thus quite apparent that the adoption of the doctrine of
Pain v. Packard has not served to afford the surety additional
protection of a clear and simple character. The result has been,
rather, that where a surety attempts to avail himself of the doc-
trine, he finds himself confronted by a mass of rules, regulations,
and technicalities by which it is far easier to become hopelessly
involved than efficaciously aided. If we assume that sureties are
favored creatures of the courts, the alleged virtue of the doc-
without any reasonable excuse, neglect to proceed until the principal has
become insolvent. See Warner v. Beardsley, supra note 21, at 199.
6 Weiler v. Hoch, supra note 15.
67 Shenandoah Nat. Bank v. Ayres, 87 Iowa 526 (1893) (service against
one of two principals not made till statutory limit up; surety discharged).
68 Sisk v. Rosenberger, supra note 21; Hardy v. Worthen, 53 Mo. App.
580 (1893); Starling v. Buttles, 2 Ohio 303 (1826). Contra: Scott v.
Bradford, 5 Port. 443 (Ala. 1837) (statute then said creditor upon notice
was "to put such bond in suit'; it now says surety may give "notice to
bring suit against the principal", and that suit is to be brought "pursuant
to such notice").
69 Hammond v. McHargue, supra note 40.
70 Robertson v. Angle, supra note 63.
71 Iowa statute, supra note 9; Citizens Bank of Pleasantville v. Hickman,
179 .Iowa 1178, 162 N. W. 606 (1917); Gardener v. Ferree, supra note 45.
72 Statutes of the following states say the creditor must prosecute to
"judgment and execution"; Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri,
Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming. The
following cases have discharged the surety because the creditor failed to
press suit: Overturf v. Martin, 2 Ind. 507 (1851) (complaint demurred to;
suit dropped but another begun in 6 months); Peters v. Linenschmidt, 58
Mo. 464 (1874) (failure to take out writ alias when principal not found);
Manning v. Shotwell, supra note 13 (suit discontinued after part payment).
But where a court refuses to issue execution, the lack of it does not dis-
charge the surety. Harrison v. Price, 66 Va. 553 (1874).
73Franklin Savings and Trust Co. v. Clark, 283 Pa. 212, 129 Atl.
56 (1925) (principal has account with creditor bank, and is allowed, the
day after notice, to check out its money on deposit).
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trine in furthering that policy is little realized; if we concede
that the function of the surety is to provide security, the doctrine
is anomolous.
DISCRETIONARY EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OF SUITS BETWEEN
NON-RESIDENT PARTIES IN NEW YORK
Courts have frequently overlooked the distinction between the
existence of jurisdiction and the exercise thereof.' While it is
generally recognized that a court, having the parties before it,
has the power to take cognizance of a transitory cause of action,
regardless of the residence of the parties, or of the place where
the cause of action arose, to exercise jurisdiction where the par-
ties are non-residents, and the cause of action foreign to the
forum, may often be deemed inexpedient. Yet there is much
doubt as to whether courts have the power to decline jurisdiction
for this reason.2 In New York, however, it is well established
that, under such circumstances, jurisdiction may be declined in
the discretion of the court. The application of the New York
rule is here considered 3 in the light of (1) the general tendency
of common law courts to entertain jurisdiction; (2) the "privi-
leges and immunities" clause of the Federal Constitution.4
Suits between non-resident aliens. While the "privileges and
immunities" clause is not applicable to alien litigants, courts
have, nevertheless, accorded to them much the same privileges
of suit as are extended to citizens.5 But, in controversies arising
outside the forum, jurisdiction is often declined for reasons of
policy or convenience. Courts, have been particularly loathe to
settle disputes between foreign seamen, to avoid possible inter-
ference with commerce.6  Jurisdiction has also been declined in
an action for damages for a tort committed in a neighboring
country where both parties resided, nothing having been shown
I The following cases are typical: lMIony v. Dows, 8 Abb. Pr. 316 (N. Y.
1859); Roberts v. Knights, 7 Allen 449 (Mass. 1863); Lee v. Baird, 1139
Ala. 526, 36 So. 720 (1903); Reeves v. Southern Ry., 121 Ga. 561, 49 S. E.
674 (1905); Smith v. Mining Co., 127 Fed. 462 (E. D. Wash. 1904).
2 Admiralty courts have long been held to have such power. 1 BE .,ICT,
ADmI.LTY (5th ed. 1925) § 84. The question raised here has reference
to common law courts only.
3 Unless otherwise noted it is assumed that there is no question as to the
existence of jurisdiction, but rather, to what extent has jurisdiction been
refused to non-resident litigants where the suit is based upon a foreign
transitory cause of action.
4"The citizens of each state' shall be entitled to all privileges and im-
munities of citizens in the several states." Art. IV, § 2.
5Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 127 Wis. 651, 658, 106 N. W. 821,
822 (1908). Also (1873) 7 ALI. L. REv. 417.
6 Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134 (N. Y. 1817) ; Olzen v. Schierenberg,
3 Daly 100 (N. Y. C. P. 1869); Peterson v. Brockelman, 1 N. Y. City Ct.
Rep. 193 (1874). Contra: Roberts v. Knights, supra note 1.
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to justify suit in this country.7 But jurisdiction has been exer-
cised where it appeared that the failure of the court to deter-
mine the case would work undue hardships upon the plaintiff.8
And it has been held 9 that, in actions arising out of commercial
transactions, there is no policy in refusing jurisdiction to alien
litigants, even though the cause of action cannot technically be
said to have arisen within the forum.
Suits between non-resident citizens. There is a considerable
difference of opinion as to whether the courts of one state can
refuse jurisdiction of transitory causes of acion arising outside
the forum between citizens of another state.0 In denying the
existence of this power, it is argued that under the "privileges
and immunities" clause of the Federal Constitution, courts can-
not discriminate between citizens of the different states, but
must accord to each citizen the same privileges of suit as are
extended to citizens of the forum." But in New York it is gen-
erally recognized that the refusal of jurisdiction to non-resident
litigants, in the discretion of the court, under circumstances in
which an action by a resident would be entertained, does not con-
7 DeWitt v. Buchanan, 54 Barb. 31 (N. Y. 1868). "It is most clearly
against the interests of those living on the border of our courts to encour-
age or entertain jurisdiction of such actions. To do so would establish a
practice which might often be attended with serious disadvantages to per-
sons crossing the border." Ibid. 33. See, in accord, Great Western Ry.
v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305, 315 (1889).
8 Johnston v. Dalton, 1 Cow. 543 (N. Y. 1823) ; State of Yucatan v. Ar-
guinedo, 92 Misc. 547, 157 N. Y. Supp. 219 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
9 Wertheim v. Clergue, 53 App. Div. 122, 65 N. Y. Supp. 750 (1st. Dept.
1900) (defendant was a resident of this country, and the contract sued on
was to be performed partly in New York). It is doubted that jurisdiction
would ordinarily be entertained where both parties were residents of a
foreign country and the contract sued on had no connection with the
forum. See Dewitt v. Buchanan, eupra note 7, at 33.
1o The problem is very fully discussed in 32 A. L. R. 6, 33-43 (1924)
annotation. See also (1928) 41 HARV. L. R v. 387; (1928) 28 COL. L. REV.
347, 351; (1926) 5 NEB. L. BULL. 222.
"1 The Supreme Court has on several occasions indicated that, under the
"privileges and immunities" clause, a citizen of one state has the privilege
of bringing suit in the courts of another state. See Ward v. Maryland,
12 Wall. 418, 430 (U. S. 1870) ; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 113-114,
10 Sup. Ct. 269, 271 (1889); Chambers v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 207 U. S.
142, 148, 28 Sup. Ct. 34, 35 (1907); Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Clarendon, 257
U. S. 533, 535, 42 Sup. Ct. 210, 211 (1922). These dicta have been used
by many state courts as a basis for holding that a court has no discretion-
ary power to dismiss an action because the parties are non-residents and
the cause of action arose in another state. Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co.,
94 Wis. 70, 68 N. W. 664 (1896); Steed v. Harvey, 18 Utah 367, 54 Pac.
1011 (1898); Bossung v. Dist. Ct., 140 Minn. 494, 168 N. W. 589 (1918);
Morgan v. Pennsylvania R. R., 138 S. E. 566 (Va. 1927). Contra: Foss
v. Richards, 139 Atl. 313 (Me. 1927); Loftus v. Pennsylvania R. R., 107
Ohio St. 352, 140 N. E. 94 (923); Stewart v. Litchenberg, 148 La. 195,
86 So. 734 (1920).
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travene the Federal Constitution. 2 In justification of this result
it is urged that the courts, already congested with cases having
no other available forum, should not be required to determine
suits between non-residents upon a foreign cause which can more
conveniently be brought elsewhere. 1 Furthermore, there would
seem to be much force to the contention that the privilege of
citizens of one state to sue in the courts of another state upon a
cause of action foreign to the latter state is not such a privilege
as is contemplated by the Constitution, but rather a privilege
resting on interstate comity.14 But, in any event, discrimination
against non-resident citizens is not necessarily unconstitutional,
unless it is unreasonable.- The New York courts have not ar-
bitrarily refused to exercise jurisdiction in the situation. Juris-
diction is ordinarily entertained in contract actions.16 And in
tort cases, jurisdiction has only been denied where there was
apparently no justification for bringing suit in New York, such
as an action for personal injuries suffered in another state where
both parties resided, the defendant being served with process
while temporarily in New York." The frequent practice of
bringing suit in New York, solely for the purpose of obtaining
a larger recovery than is usually allowed in the state where the
12 Hatfield v. Sisson, 28 Mfisc. 255, 59 N. Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct. 1899);
Collard v. Beach, 93 App. Div. 339, 87 N. Y. Supp. 884 (1st Dept. 1904).
13 Cases cited supra note 12.
'L See dissenting opinion of Cassoday, J., in Eingartner v. Illinois Steel
Co., supra note 11, at 84. Also (1903) 17 HARv. L. Rv. 54; 32 A. L. R.
6, 23 (1924), suggesting that the right of a citizen tut sue in the courts
of a particular state is an incident of local, not of general citizenship, as
are the right of suffrage, the right to the use of state-maintained schools,
the right to take fish from inland waters, and other privileges to which the
constitutional guaranty is held not to apply.
25 La Tourette v. McMaster, 245 U. S. 465, 39 Sup. Ct. 160 (1919); 1
COOLEY, CONSTrrTUTIONAL LIMTATIONS (Sth ed. 1927) 49; (1928) 41 HAnv.
L. REv. 387, 388; (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 347, 349.
'
6 Furbush v. Nye, 17 App. Div. 325, 45 N. Y. Supp. 214 (1st Dept.
1897); Smith v. Crocker, 14 App. Div. 245, 43 N. Y. Supp. 427 (1st Dept
1897); Belden v. Wilkinson, 44 App. Div. 420, 60 N. Y. Supp. 1083 (1-t
Dept. 1899); Atkins v. Fitzpatrick, 57 Mlisc. 341, 109 N. Y. Supp. G19 (Sup.
Ct. 1908).
27 Ferguson v. Neilson, 58 Hun 604, 11 N. Y. Supp. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1890)
mem.; Hatfield v. Sisson, supra note 12; Collard v. Beach, su-pra note 12:
cf. Latourette v. Clarke, 45 Barb. 327 (N. Y. 1865) (erroneously reported
in 30 How. Pr. 242 (N. Y. 1866). In Mlolony v. Dows, spra note 1, the
court was of the opinion that it had no jurisdiction of an action for dam-
ages for a personal tort committed in California where both parties re-
sided. This was overruled by the case of Burdick v. Freeman, 120 N. Y.
420, 24 N. E. 949 (1890), an action for damages for a personal tort be-
tween residents of another state where the wrong was suffered, in which
it was held that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court would
not be set aside because of defendant's failure to object seasonably, al-
though the court might have done so of its own motion.
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plaintiff resides, is persuasive of the propriety of refusing juris-
diction in such a case.
Suits against foreign corporations. Before any discussion as
to when a court may in its discretion assume or decline jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation in suits by a non-resident upon a
foreign cause of action becomes pertinent, it is important to note
that there is considerable question as to whether a state can
constitutionally impose its jurisdiction upon a foreign corpora-
tion in this situation.' It has been said that the Supreme Court
of the United States has not yet definitely authorized the exer-
cise of jurisdiction in such a case, and that no such sanction
should be granted. 9 But a more persuasive afgument has been
presented to the effect that in transitory actions jurisdiction can
be imposed on the theory that a foreign corporation actually do-
ing business through an agent is amenable to personal service
precisely like an individual.20 In New York, prior to 1913, a
foreign corporation could not be sued by a non-resident unless
the cause of action arose, or the subject matter of the suit was
situated within the forum.2 1 But in 1913 the code was amended
to extend jurisdiction, in actions by non-residents, to cases where
the foreign corporation "is doing business within the state." 22
This was construed, however, as leaving the courts with the
power to exercise discretion as to the retention of jurisdiction
of causes of action arising outside the forum. 23 The result may
be summarized somewhat as follows: jurisdiction has been
seldom denied except in cases where the action was based upon
a personal tort suffered in another state where the suit could
be brought without hardship to either party,2 4 or where there
18 The problem has been discussed by Bullington, Jurisdiction Over For-
eign Corporations (1928)- 6 N. C. L. REV. 147; Scott, Jurisdiction Over
Non-Resident Motorists (1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 563, 572 et seq.; Fead,
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1926) 24 MIcH. L. Rov. 633.
19 Scott, op. cit. supra note 18, at 579, n. 40; Fead, op. cit. supra note 18,
at 646-647.
20 Bullington, op. cit. supra note 18, at 156-163.
21 N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. (1909) § 1780. Robinson v. Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co., 112 N. Y. 315, 19 N. E. 625 (1889); Johnson v. Victoria
Chief Mining Co., 150 App. Div. 653, 135 N. Y. Supp. 1070, (1st. Dept.
1912); Fairclough v. Southern Pac. R. R., 171 App. Div. 496, 157 N. Y.
Supp. 862 (1st Dept. 1916).
22 N. Y. Laws 1913, c. 60.
23 Waisikoski v. Philadelphia Coal & Ice Co., 173 App. Div. 538, 159 N. Y.
Supp. 906 (2d Dept. 1916), aff'd 228 N. Y. 581, 127 N. E. 923 (1920).
But in suits by bona fide residents jurisdiction cannot be declined. Gre-
gonis v. Philadelphia Coal & Ice Co., 235 N. Y. 152, 139 N. E. 223 (1923);
Bagdon v. Philadelphia Coal & Ice Co., 217 N. Y. 432, 111 N. E. 1075
(1916); Andriuzsis v. Philadelphia Coal & Ice Co., 172 App. Div. 350, 156
N. Y. Supp. 260 (2d Dept. 1915).
24 Jurisdiction exercised: Commonwealth Mtg. Co. v. Sargent Co., 104
Misc. 558, 172 N. Y. Supp. 594 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Moore v. Atchison T. &
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was collusion or fraud in invoking the jurisdiction of the court.=2
Conclusion. While the general policy of common law courts
has been to entertain jurisdiction of transitory causes of action
regardless of the residence of the parties or of the place where
the cause of action arose, the New York courts have long recog-
nized the expediency of making the exercise of jurisdiction, in
suits between non-residents upon a foreign cause of action, de-
pend upon the sound discretion of the court. With the calendars
of courts congested, and the consequent impossibility of admin-
istering speedy justice, the propriety of refusing jurisdiction in
actions which can be conveniently brought elsewhere becomes
manifest. -2 6 Yet, as already noted, the refusal of jurisdiction
has been confined, in the main, to tort cases in which no legiti-
mate reason for suing in New York appeared.2' It is interesting
to note, further, that the New York courts have recognized that
a non-resident can in effect require a court to assume jurisdic-
tion, by assigning his cause of action to a resident, even though
the assignment was without consideration, and for the ex-%press
purpose of bringing suit.2 8
S. F. Ry., 106 Mlisc. 58, 174 N. Y. Supp. 60 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd 189 App.
Div. 906, 178 N. Y. Supp. 878 (2d Dept. 1919) (jurisdiction of state courtz
not affected by Act of Congress relating to venue of suits against car-
riers); Davis v. Kessler Co., 118 Mlisc. 292, 194 N. Y. Supp. 9 (1922) (con-
tract); Buonanno v. Southern Pac. R. R., 121 lisc. 99, 205 N. Y. Supp.
791 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (contract); Richter v. Chicago R. 1. & P. Ry., 123
Misc. 234, 205 N. Y. Supp. 128 (Sup. CL 1924) (tort).
Jurisdiction declined: Waisikoski v. Philadelphia Coal & Ice Co., sapra
note 23; Bagdon v. Philadelphia Coal & Ice Co., 178 App. Div. 662, 165
N. Y. Supp. 910 (2d Dept. 1917); O'Hara v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 178
App. Div. 956 (1917) mem.
25 Pietraroia v. New Jersey R. R., 197 N. Y. 434, 91 N. E. 120 (1910);
Hoes v. New York, N. H. & H._R. R., 173 N. Y. 435, 66 N. E. 119 (1903).
6 . . in the metropolis of the country, toward which and in cloze
proximity other states having large cities and thickly populated communi-
ties converge, and where there are almost countless people engaged in busi-
nesx who reside in other states, it would impose an undue burden upon
th courts of our state if the practice were established of assuming juris-
diction in such cases." Collard v. Beach, supra note 12 at 340, 87 N. Y.
Supp. at 886.
2 See cases cited supra notes 6, 7, 17, 24.
28 McCauley v. Ga. R. R. Bank, 122 Misc. 632, 203 N. Y. Supp. 550 (Sup.
Ct. 1924).
